The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in Justice Burke’s opinion. The dissenting opinions, however, impel me to add this postscript.
Justice Tobriner implies that parole officers are malevolent functionaries dedicated to the deprivation of normal human existence by the parolees in their charge. Justice Peters asserts those of us in the majority adhere to a fiction “so divorced from reality that it cannot be tolerated by any fair-minded man.” It is my two learned colleagues, with their gaze commendably fixed on the stars, who are tripping over reality.
Parole officers, like all public servants, are presumed to faithfully perform their duties, and there are several pragmatic reasons why they would do so. 1 First, the economy of the state, particularly in these times of austerity, benefits from the release of prisoners, and conversely, suffers the burden of support whenever it must incarcerate increasing numbers of prison inmates. There has been a markedly expanded use of parole procedures in recent years. Second, parole officers are understandably desirous of demonstrating that parole works; the merit of the system is measured by those who achieve successful adjustment on parole, not by numbers of revocations. Third, there is absolutely no empirical evidence that the parolee who “works at a job, lives with his family . . . and generally pursues a normal law-abiding *181 life” (Tobriner dissent, post, p. 193) is deemed a parole violator, and no motivation for parole officers seeking return of such an exemplary person to prison has been suggested. In the instant case petitioner Tucker admitted possession of a gun, a dubious indication of a normal law-abiding life.
Justice Tobriner’s literate discussion of the due process requirements of timely and adequate notice, and an opportunity to be heard, is more academic than apposite here. The real thrust of his dissent, and its departure from the norm, is the insistence upon presence of counsel at parole proceedings. He would require counsel for every parolee, the indigents to obtain representation at state expense.
Although Justice Burke has demonstrated that counsel is not required before the Adult Authority under existing constitutional, statutory or case law, it can be conceded arguendo that salutary benefits could accrue from the presence of counsel at such administrative proceedings. Indeed I would agree that as an ideal a skilled member of the bar should either be available for hire or provided out of the public treasury for every adult and every juvenile with a civil or criminal problem that has the slightest potential of subjecting him to physical detention, monetary loss or moral humiliation. The day may come when there is an adequate lawyer population and sufficient public sophistication to achieve that ideal. I regret, perhaps more than my dissenting brethren who fail to consider the problem of logistics, that the day does not yet appear on the horizon. Nor will it be hastened by judicial fiat.
A few statistics may be instructive. The California penal institution population was 28,462 at the beginning of 1969, an increase of 6,200 felons over the preceding decade. 2 The annual increase in the number of inmates has ranged from slight in some years as to as much as 13.5 percent, as was the case in 1958.
Ninety-two percent of all felons released from prison are placed on parole. The current parole population consists of 10,764 men and 1,069 women, increases of 59.1 and 65.7 percent respectively over the preceding 10 years. Eighteen percent of the male, and 15.3 percent of the female parolees are found to be violators within the very first year of their parole, some by infractions of parole conditions and some by the conviction of other crimes. After the first year, the violation ratio rises sharply. Between 45 and 51 percent of all parolees have their parole suspended after the first and before the second year of parole, and by the fifth year as many as 63.9 percent are determined to be violators.
*182 The picture is not quite as bleak as it may seem at first blush. For every 100 paroles suspended, approximately 23 are reinstated without additional confinement. The most common circumstance reported by the Department of Corrections is the parolee whose whereabouts are unknown; when found, and if he has been law-abiding while at large, he will be reinstated forthwith.
The foregoing data have relevance to our problem. We are not here concerned merely with the difficulties of Preston Tucker; we must view the broad spectrum of more than 4,000 parole suspensions each year, and of that number of parolees some move in and out of the parole system two or three times as they attempt the difficult adjustment to an orderly society.
Formal hearings, with counsel hired or provided, for the more than 4.000 parole suspensions annually would alone require an undertaking of heroic proportions. 3 But that is only the beginning. For if there is a right to counsel at parole revocation or suspension proceedings, no reason in law or logic can be advanced why a prisoner, appearing before the Adult Authority as an applicant for parole and seeking to have his indeterminate sentence made determinate, should not also have legal representation. A rule providing counsel for a felon facing suspension of parole but not for a felon seeking parole would constitute invidious discrimination and be constitutionally defective. Thus we must consider the practicality of the presence of counsel every year for every appearance before the Adult Authority of every prisoner who has served his minimum sentence or á percentage thereof.
The conclusion is inescapable that my dissenting brethren are in effect insisting upon counsel for a potential of 32,000 appearances annually: 28.000 parole applicants 4 and 4,000 parole revokees. This monumental requirement would stagger the imagination.
To compound the logistical problem, the Adult Authority of necessity *183 meets in the several correctional institutions. Not one prison is located in any of the nine most populous counties in the state, the counties in which the greater number of members of the bar practice. The supply of counsel, limited as it is, does not exist where the demand would be. 5
Hearings, to be effective, should be adversary. If counsel are permitted to defend the parolee, it would seem that other counsel should be available to present accusatory evidence. Therein lies still another problem: where will California find the prosecutors for these thousands of cases? Parole officers are nonlawyers, and even if they possessed the skills adequate for parole proceedings, the United States Parole Board complained that “. . . to require [parole officers] to appear at hundreds of revocation hearings annually, convened in many instances at places distant from areas under their supervision, would render it impossible for them to carry on their normal duties.” (Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings (1964) 55 J.Crim.L., C.&P.S. 175, 195.)
Since Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ], the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been broadly extended. (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 811 , 83 S.Ct. 814 ]; White v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 59 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 193 , 83 S.Ct. 1050]; Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 246 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 ]; Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ]; Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]; Swenson v. Rosier (1967) 386 U.S. 258 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 33 , 87 S.Ct. 996 ]; Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 493 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 ]; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 432 P.2d 21 ]; Entsminger v. Iowa (1967) 386 U.S. 748 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 501 , 87 S.Ct. 1402 ]; In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 527 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 ]; Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 336 , 88 S.Ct. 254 ].)
Few thoughtful observers quarrel with the salutary results of the foregoing decisions. But in these past eight years the increased demands upon the legal profession—only a small percentage of which is skilled in the criminal law—have been overwhelming. Public defenders are inundated with cases, and court-appointed counsel are harried. The quantity of work has been reflected in the not infrequent dubious quality of service rendered; petitions to reviewing courts on grounds of inadequate representation have *184 multiplied many times. (People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ]; In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 474 P.2d 969 ]; Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals (1971) 23 Stan. L.Rev. 676, 693.)
As a thoughtful commentator pointed out in connection with the Wade decision: “. . . no one has examined what sort of burden this additional requirement might impose on members of the bar whose resources have already been seriously taxed by recent rulings. The vast expansion of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel has created an immense burden for the organized bar. Legal Aid and Public Defender programs, while multiplying with great rapidity, have not been able to scratch the surface of the need for qualified defense lawyers. The last of Gideon’s progeny has certainly not yet been seen. . . .” (Read, Lawyers at Lineups (1969) 17 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 339, 377.)
There are three alternatives to this unfolding dilemma. The first is to increase our supply of lawyers. This is eminently desirable, but obviously any recruitment program by law schools will not be felt for some years. The second is to permit unlicensed practice of the law. To a limited extent this was permitted by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery (1969) 393 U.S. 483 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 718 , 89 S.Ct. 747 ] (also see In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 470 P.2d 640 ]), but on any expansive scale such practice would clearly be counterproductive. The third alternative, necessary for the present, is to avoid judicially extending the required presence of hired or appointed counsel beyond the areas compelled by the Constitution. At such time as the numerous practical problems appear ripe for solution, primarily the availability of attorneys in sufficient numbers, we can anticipate adoption of appropriate procedure by the Legislature.
The proposals of the dissenting justices, in the language of our opinion in In re Marks (1969) 71 Cal.2d 31, 48 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 453 P.2d 441 ], a case in which this court unanimously denied counsel and hearings in CRC release suspensions, “would impose an excessive burden on the machinery of the administration of justice.”
Parole and probation officers are thus indispensable, and the profession should be vastly elevated in numbers, in prestige, and in salary. Its responsibility is great and should be greater. By their counsel, encouragement, warning, and befriending, many one-time offenders, with whom they keep in touch, are supported in new life efforts by these skilled and experienced guides and friends.” (Dr. Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (1968) p. 266; also see Clark, Crime in America (1970) pp. 237-238.)
All figures used herein were reported by the Department of Corrections, State of California, in its most recent publication, California Prisoners 1968.
A few states allow counsel at parole revocation hearings, but no state has a volume of proceedings comparable to California (e.g., California has approximately 43 percent more parole revocations than New York and over six times as many as Pennsylvania (The Book of the States (1966-1967) p. 408)). In Michigan, which permits counsel, in “only a handful of the thousand or so revocations each year has the offender elected to appear at a hearing with counsel.” (Radish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process (1961) 45 Minn.L.Rev. 803, 838.) The same commentary points out, “given the multitude of parole and revocation proceedings it may prove inordinately expensive and otherwise impractical for the state to provide counsel.” (Id. at p. 839.)
This figure is slightly less than the total prison population. As indicated above, 92 percent of all prison inmates ultimately are released on parole.
There are 2,220 inmates at the California Conservation Center, located at Susan-ville, 293 miles northeast of the metropolitan Bay Area. In all of Lassen County there are eight members of the State Bar. One of those members is the district attorney.