expert testifying to general acceptance of scientific technique must be “not so personally invested in establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not be objective”
How later courts described this case
- expert testifying to general acceptance of scientific technique must be “not so personally invested in establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not be objective”
- consider scientific literature outside record
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115 (1991)
Because of this conclusion, we need not address the continuing validity of People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255, 110 S.Ct. 1078].
Questioned by People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499 (1992)
In light of this conclusion, we need not, and do not, address the continuing validity of People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255,110 S.Ct. 1078] and Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190], (People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 452, fn. 23; People v. Cooper, sup…
Declined to follow by People v. Bradney, 170 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1988)
To the extent the cases from other jurisdictions on which the Bradneys rely (Young, 425 Mich 470, 391 N.W.2d 270; People v. Brown (1985), 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834) impose such a requirement, we decline to follow those decisions.
The opinion
BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur only in the judgment. I write separately to underscore my misgivings about the majority’s use of *548 a procedure which insulates from review by the United States Supreme Court our decision on the constitutionality of two important aspects of the 1978 Briggs Initiative.
It is troubling that a case with clear penalty phase error is being used as the lead case to pass on the constitutionality of the 1978 death penalty láw. While my colleagues “are mindful of the principles of judicial restraint which caution against premature consideration of constitutional issues” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 538, fn. 9), nevertheless they proceed to rule on the constitutionality of Penal Code section 190.3, subdivision (k) and the so-called “mandatory” aspect of the 1978 law, on the ground that it would not be “appropriate for this court to withhold guidance simply because defendant’s death penalty judgment is being reversed on other grounds.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 538, fn. 9.)
Such a procedure, of course, violates this court’s own cautions that “we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.” (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 888 , 547 P.2d 1000 ].) Moreover, engaging in such judicial commentary in a case where the court reverses the death sentence on other grounds will, as a practical matter, effectively insulate the substance of appellant’s federal constitutional challenges from United States Supreme Court review. (See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 197 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ] (cone. opn. of Bird, C. J.).) I see no reason for reaching out and construing the statute at this point and violating “not only honored tenets of judicial restraint but also sound principles of federalism.” (Ibid.)
A majority of this court declined to pass on the constitutionality of the 1977 death penalty law in Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pages 188-196 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J. and Newman, J.), 196-199 (cone. opn. of Bird, C. J.), and 199 (cone. opn. of Tobriner, J.), and in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 49-50 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ]. As Justice Mosk explained in Frierson , the constitutionality of the law under the federal charter “can finally be decided, whether by this court or by the United States Supreme Court, only when there is presented on appeal an otherwise unimpeachable judgment of death. Until such a judgment is before us for review we cannot determine whether the legislation in question was constitutionally applied; and until then I also deem it appropriate to withhold a final decision on whether—and if so, how—that legislation can reasonably be construed to be constitutional on its face.” ( 25 Cal.3d at p. 195 .) Those thoughts are fully applicable here. 1
*549 My colleagues do not intimate—nor am I able to discern—what prompts the conclusion that after seven years of silence on these subjects, it suddenly becomes “inappropriate” to withhold judgment on issues which are unnecessary for resolution in this case. If this court intended to rely on such reasoning to make bold advisory pronouncements on the constitutionality of the 1978 law, the time for doing so was soon after its passage, either in one of the first automatic appeals arising under the 1978 law or in a properly presented pretrial writ petition. (See, e.g., Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 424, 427-428 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 650 , 556 P.2d 1101 ] [1973 capital punishment law found unconstitutional].)
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 30, 1986, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Lucas, J., and Panelli, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
The majority also rely on People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 150 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ] to justify their actions. Yet Ramos concerned only one aspect of the 1978 law—the “Briggs commutation instruction”—which had been dealt with in an earlier *549 opinion by this court that was reversed and remanded by the United States Supreme Court. Nothing in Ramos condoned the practice of issuing an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of several aspects of the 1978 law. On the contrary, in Ramos this court noted that in light of the reversal of the special circumstance finding and ensuing penalty verdict, “there [was] no need to address the bulk of the penalty phase issues raised by defendant.” ( 37 Cal.3d at p. 150 .)