expert testifying to general acceptance of scientific technique must be “not so personally invested in establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not be objective”
How later courts described this case
- expert testifying to general acceptance of scientific technique must be “not so personally invested in establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not be objective”
- consider scientific literature outside record
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by People v. Jones, 53 Cal. 3d 1115 (1991)
Because of this conclusion, we need not address the continuing validity of People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255, 110 S.Ct. 1078].
Questioned by People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499 (1992)
In light of this conclusion, we need not, and do not, address the continuing validity of People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990) 494 U.S. 299 [108 L.Ed.2d 255,110 S.Ct. 1078] and Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190], (People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 452, fn. 23; People v. Cooper, sup…
Declined to follow by People v. Bradney, 170 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1988)
To the extent the cases from other jurisdictions on which the Bradneys rely (Young, 425 Mich 470, 391 N.W.2d 270; People v. Brown (1985), 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834) impose such a requirement, we decline to follow those decisions.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the affirmance of the defendant’s guilt, in the finding of special circumstances and in parts IV B and C of the majority opinion, but I must dissent from the reversal of the penalty judgment as provided in part IV A of the opinion.
Had there been several grounds requiring reversal of the penalty, I would have considered concurring under compulsion of People v. Lanphear (1984) *546 36 Cal.3d 163 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 680 P.2d 1081 ], and People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 ]. However, because the majority’s only basis for reversal is the giving of the standard instruction advising the jury against being swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” (CALJIC No. 1.00), I must once again urge they are in error.
Rather than repeat my analysis of that commonly given instruction, I refer to the reasons expressed in my dissents in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 619 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 463 P.2d 408 ], Lanphear, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 169 , and Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 886 .
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.