stating that unless the enabling legislation provides otherwise, the performance of purely ministerial or administrative duties may be delegated
How later courts described this case
- stating that unless the enabling legislation provides otherwise, the performance of purely ministerial or administrative duties may be delegated
- "Where the enabling legislation under which a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation derives its power confides legislative or discretionary functions in particular officials or boards, such functions may not be delegated to others."
- political questions lie outside the cognizance of the judiciary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Schwellenbach, J.
(dissenting) — I agree that the three branches of our government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, are each separate and distinct from the other. Nevertheless,, they are interdependent upon each other, and all three, functioning together, constitute the state government.
The constitution placed upon the legislative branch the duty of enacting laws. However, it also placed certain restrictions upon the legislature, as to how and in what manner such laws could be enacted.
Art. II, § 19, provides:
“Bill to Contain One Subject. — No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.”
Art. II, § 37, provides:
“Revision or Amendment. — No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length.”
Art. II, § 38, provides:
“Limitation on Amendments. — No amendment to any bill shall be allowed which shall change the scope and object of the bill.”
*247 An examination of the legislative history clearly reveals that the above constitutional restrictions were ignored and violated in enacting this legislation.
The legislature has no right to violate those positive constitutional restrictions, and then say to the court, whose duty it is to determine whether or not an act is constitutional, “You cannot go behind an enrolled bill and consider the legislative history of an act for the purpose of determining whether or not we violated any constitutional provisions.” By drawing such an iron curtain around its transactions, the legislature is usurping the functions of the judiciary and is preventing it from properly performing the duties placed upon it by the constitution. As was so ably stated by Chief Justice Murray, in Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165 (despite the criticism of Professor Wigmore):
“. . . and our constitution has wisely so distributed the powers of government, as to make one a check upon the other, thereby preventing one branch from strengthening itself both at the expense of the co-ordinate branches, and of the public.”
I believe that State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 , 34 Pac. 201 , and all kindred cases should be overruled, in order that the judiciary may be restored to its proper place and exercise its functions as a co-ordinate branch of the government.