holding that defendant’s conviction of both stealing a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle violated § 11 because defendant “had to necessarily possess the vehicle to be convicted of stealing it”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant’s conviction of both stealing a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle violated § 11 because defendant “had to necessarily possess the vehicle to be convicted of stealing it”
- stating State is prohibited from prosecuting a person for felony murder and the predicate felony
- trial court gave no introductory instructions, failed to advise potential jurors of other penalties, and asked general questions regarding fairness and impartiality
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUMPKIN, Judge:
concurring in parVdissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s decision affirming the conviction for Murder in the First Degree and remanding for resentencing, and reversing to dismiss the conviction for Using a Weapon in the Commission of a Crime. However, I find the application of 21 O.S.Supp.1987, § 11 to the convictions of possession of a Stolen Vehicle and Concealing Stolen Property inconsistent with the analysis of the other crimes evidence pursuant to 12 O.S.1981, §§ 2403, 2404, and the facts in this case. If the acts are separate and independent for one purpose, they are separate and independent for both. Under the analysis in the opinion, a person who steals property could never be convicted of concealing that same property, regardless of how far it was transported or what actions were taken to conceal it. I believe this analysis goes far afield of the intent of Section 11. I would affirm both the Possession of Stolen Vehicle and Concealing Stolen Property convictions due to the evidence establishing these offenses were separate offenses based on the acts of the defendant.