Opinion

Jones v. State

  • 66 O.B.A.J. 2246
  • 899 P.2d 635
  • 1995 OK CR 34
  • 1995 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 39
  • 1995 WL 385372
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
Filed
Jun 30, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Johnson
On the bench
Strubhar, Johnson, Lumpkin, Chapel, Lane
Cited by
15 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.6%

holding that defendant’s conviction of both stealing a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle violated § 11 because defendant “had to necessarily possess the vehicle to be convicted of stealing it”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that defendant’s conviction of both stealing a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle violated § 11 because defendant “had to necessarily possess the vehicle to be convicted of stealing it”
  • stating State is prohibited from prosecuting a person for felony murder and the predicate felony
  • trial court gave no introductory instructions, failed to advise potential jurors of other penalties, and asked general questions regarding fairness and impartiality

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JOHNSON, Presiding Judge:

concurring in parVdissenting in part.

I concur with the Court herein as it relates to the finding of guilt, but I dissent as to the reversal and remanding this ease for resen-tencing. The Court has based its resentenc-ing on what we have come to know as “reverse Witherspoon excludables”.

Courts have long had a problem with the automatic exclusion of jurors in a death penalty case. The Supreme Court originally said that one who “automatically” would vote against the imposition of a death penalty would be excluded from a jury panel for cause. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Supreme Court wanted to clarify the Wither-spoon decision, and did so some years later in the case of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). The Court held that a juror is to be removed from the jury panel for cause when he or she would automatically vote for the death penalty and fail to consider the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

I agree with the State in this regard that counsel did get to ask the jurors whether they would follow the instructions as to guilt or innocence, as well as punishment. Any irregularity was cured by this question. I would, therefore, affirm not only the judgment, but the sentence herein.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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