The opinion
GOODWIN, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I believe, however, that the dissent flashes a warning which should not be ignored by prosecutors and lawmakers. It is obvious that the police in the case at bar violated ORS 133.550. That statute requires that the defendant be taken before a magistrate without delay. Since ORS 133.550 is not self-executing, its practical effect has been virtually zero. The dissent points to the remedy devised by the federal courts in similar circumstances, and suggests that this court follow their lead. I am *366 not persuaded that we should adopt that course at this time. I would prefer first to give the legislative and executive branches a reasonable opportunity to make appropriate rules to ensure lawful conduct by police officers.
If those primarily charged with the duty of enforcing the law are unwilling or unable to discharge their duty in this respect, then the courts should not shrink from their duty. Prosecutors should give thoughtful attention to the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion. The evolution of federal rules on search and seizure should not be lost upon state prosecutors. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 , 81 S Ct 1684 , 6 L Ed2d 1081 (1961). Oregon should not be unprepared for a similar evolution in the federal law on unreasonable delay in presenting an accused before a magistrate.