holding that where a salary increase takes effect during the term for which a legislator is elected does not prevent the legislator from standing for election, since no part of the salary increase will be earned during the legislator’s term
How later courts described this case
- holding that where a salary increase takes effect during the term for which a legislator is elected does not prevent the legislator from standing for election, since no part of the salary increase will be earned during the legislator’s term
- Provision of the Washington Constitution that "[ejach house shall be the judge of the election, returns and qualifications of its own members” did not divest the court of jurisdiction to determine the qualifications of candidates in a primary election
- strong policy in favor of eligi bility for public office “and the constitution, where the language and context allows, should be construed so as to preserve this eligibility”
- “[a] strong public policy exists in favor of eligibility for public office, and the constitution, where the language and context allows, should be construed so as to preserve this eligibility”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hill, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority and I both start with the same constitutional provision for construction:
No member of the legislature, during the term for which he is elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office in the state, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during the term for which he was elected. Const, art. 2, § 13.
We arrive at widely disparate results.
I am in accord with much that is said in the course of the elaborate argument 7 by which the majority arrives at its construction.
I agree with the majority that there is a justiciable controversy which we ought to decide now. I agree with the *571 strong policy favoring eligibility for public office, which they express. I agree wholeheartedly with the majority that the legislature
remains the single most democratic organ of constitutional government yet devised, reflecting with greater clarity and frequency probably than any of our institutions — save possibly the public schools — the will and aspirations of a free people. From this academy of free representative government have come some of our greatest presidents, ablest jurists, most capable members of the Congress, and outstanding statesmen. Perhaps no greater school exists for the training of men to leadership in a democracy than service in a state legislature.
And frankly, I see no harm or injury to our society, and no dangers rushing in to imperil the state, if the members of the legislature which increased legislative salaries are permitted to be candidates for re-election during the term in which they increased the emoluments of the office. 8 The whole point is, despite all that has been said in the majority opinion, that the quoted constitutional provision says the members of the legislature shall not be elected or appointed to a civil office during the term for which they have been elected, the emoluments of which they have increased during the term for which they have been elected.
The 39th Legislature raised the salary to be paid members of the legislature from $1,200 to $3,600 a year, and if § 13, art. 2 of the constitution does not prohibit the members of that legislature from being elected to the legislature in 1966 (or 1968, in the case of hold-over Senators), i.e., during the term for which they were elected, it does not prohibit anything, and makes of it a choice bit of nonsense. Whether it was a wise provision when adopted, or whether it is a *572 wise provision now, are debatable issues; but beyond debate, the constitution still reads:
No member of the legislature, during the term for which he is elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office in the state, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during the term for which he was elected. Const, art. 2, § 13.
On page 568 of the majority opinion, it is said:
But if the term drawing the increased salary begins at the end of the legislator’s term, then the salary will not halve been increased during the term for which he was elected to the legislature. (Emphasis by the majority.)
This is a play on words. No one can say, “Look the 39th Legislature didn’t increase the salaries because the increase didn’t take effect during the term for which they were elected.” If the 39th Legislature did not increase the salary, what legislature did — the 38th or the 40th?
Further it seems to me to miss the point entirely. True it satisfies the requirement of Const, art. 2, § 25, that no compensation of any public officer shall be increased during his term of office; but we are not here concerned with when the increase becomes effective, but with whether a member of the legislature that increased the emoluments of a certain office, can be appointed or elected to that office during that legislative term. The constitution says, no.
The 39th Legislature increased the emoluments for legislators. Any member of the 39th Legislature, except a holdover Senator, who seeks to be a member of the 40th Legislature must be elected in 1966. Any such member elected in 1966 would necessarily be elected during his term of office as a member of the 39th Legislature.
August 2, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied.
Since this argument so largely hinges on State ex rel. Carroll v. Munro, 52 Wn.2d 522 , 327 P.2d 729 (1958), which is hailed as a repudiation of State ex rel. Pennick, v. Hall, 26 Wn.2d 172 , 173 P.2d 153 (1946), I would like to point out that everything that was said in Carroll v. Munro, supra, about Mr. Munro’s eligibility or noneligibility to be a county commissioner, by reason of his having been a member of the legislature which raised the salary of that office, was dicta. All that the case held was that Mr. Munro had no right to hold the office of county commissioner. His appointment by the Governor was set aside because the legislature had acted unconstitutionally in attempting to confer on the Governor the authority to fill a vacancy on a three-member board of county commissioners, when there were two commissioners qualified and functioning as a board. That was decisive of the case, and all that was decided. In my opinion the Pennick case is squarely in point and was properly decided. We there relied strongly on State ex rel. Reynolds v. Howell, 70 Wash. 467 , 126 Pac. 954 (1912), and its construction of the “term for which he was elected.” For all practical purposes our holding in that case determined who was to be elected Governor of the state in 1912. That opinion, the majority ignores.
Indeed, I can see great loss to the state if experienced legislators were not permitted to be candidates. That unfortunately is not the question — but rather: does the constitution permit them to be candidates under the circumstances here existing. There would still seem to be an alternative if the loss of their services for a session is deemed to be irreparable — a special session could be called, and the salary increase could be repealed, thus removing the bar to the candidacy of the present legislators.