determining that, after the suspect invoked his right to counsel, the detectives’ words and actions that answered or deflected a number of direct questions from the suspect regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent
How later courts described this case
- determining that, after the suspect invoked his right to counsel, the detectives’ words and actions that answered or deflected a number of direct questions from the suspect regarding what he would be charged with, when he could go home, whether he would be arrested, when he could use the phone, how the victim was doing, and where he would go next, did not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent
- explaining that “interrogation” is “express questioning by law enforcement officers or its functional equivalent — any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” (citation and punctuation omitted)
- holding that “I want a lawyer” was unequivocal
- rejecting argument that act of officers in remaining in room with suspect after he invoked his rights is interrogation and impermissible under Miranda
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUNSTEIN, Chief
Justice, dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Brown was not subjected to interrogation after unequivocally invoking his right to counsel, I must respectfully dissent.
In the context of an alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), “ ‘any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) *481 that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect’ [Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301 (100 SC 1682, 64 LE2d 297) (1980)]” constitute questioning or interrogation. Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 717 (4) ( 482 SE2d 330 ) (1997).
[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has made clear that “(i)n deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation, we must remember the purpose behind [its] decisions in Miranda and Edwards: preventing government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.” [Cit.]
Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 825-826 (2) ( 514 SE2d 657 ) (1999). Although the detectives here did not question Brown in the traditional sense, they should have known that their actions, or lack thereof, after Brown invoked his right to counsel were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements from him. The majority relies on the fact that the detectives’ behavior was polite rather than overtly coercive, but it is “the coercive nature of confinement” itself that is at issue. See id.
The majority states that, in context, a detective’s comment to Brown that “[t]he quicker we get a grasp on things the better we will be able to more accurately answer any questions” did not constitute “bargaining answers for information about the crimes.” Maj. Op. at 478. However, the context of the comment was as follows:
DETECTIVE: .. . We understand you want a lawyer, if you would like, if you have a lawyer that you know of, we can try to .. .
BROWN: I do but he is [in] Lumpkin County.
DETECTIVE: OK, do you want us to [try] and contact him now umm . . .
BROWN: If you got my wallet, if you want to bring it in here. If you would like to try to, yeah that would be fine.
DETECTIVE: We can try to do that, the only reason I said that. ..
BROWN: His name is Jeffery Ward.
DETECTIVE: The only reason I said that is umm you know. . .
BROWN: He’s done my cases before. He knows all about me, he’s known me for about eight to nine years now and he knows all my family.
*482 Decided July 5, 2010.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Dana J. Norman, John R. Edwards, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurhert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellant.
Jack J. Menendez, for appellee.
DETECTIVE: The quicker we get a grasp on things the better we will be able to more accurately answer any questions you might have.
This comment is clearly an express conditioning of answers to Brown’s earlier questions concerning potential charges and bond upon his making an uncounseled statement about the crimes, which the detectives should have known was reasonably likely to cause Brown to make an incriminating statement.
Moreover, after Brown made his unequivocal request for counsel, several minutes elapsed before the detectives left the room to obtain the attorney’s contact information; from the time Brown located the attorney’s card in his wallet until the detectives left the room again to attempt to contact the attorney, several more minutes passed. As these delays on the part of the detectives could have been construed as demonstrating a lack of intent to comply with Brown’s request for counsel, they were reasonably likely to cause Brown to make an incriminating, uncounseled statement. See generally Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683 (2) ( 631 SE2d 671 ) (2006) (right to remain silent scrupulously honored when investigator immediately stopped interview and physically exited room).
As the record supports a finding that Brown was subject to police questioning after his unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of Brown’s motion to suppress.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Hines join in this dissent.