The opinion
CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority, nor can I agree with the reasoning upon which that conclusion is based.
Under section 11620 of the Health and Safety Code, the claimant of an interest in a vehicle may prove, in a proceeding to forfeit the vehicle on the ground that it was used in violation of the narcotics laws, that his lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract is bona fide and that it “was created after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser, and without any knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged. ’ ’ In the event of such proof the security interest shall not be forfeited. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11622.)
The trial court found that the respondent, the Bank of America, had an interest in the automobile which is the subject of this proceeding at the time of its seizure; that the interest of the bank was bona fide and was created without any knowledge that the vehicle was to be used in violation of the narcotics laws; and that the bank did not make any investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner and purchaser of the automobile (Nick Chronis) before the bank’s interest was acquired. The court also found, on substantial evidence, that the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner was good at the time of the creation of the bank’s interest, but that such fact was not known to the legal owner (the bank) at that time. The court concluded that section 11620 of the Health & Safety Code is not applicable and that a reasonable investigation need not be shown by the legal owner since the *479 moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner was good and since under section 3532 of the Civil Code the law neither does nor requires idle acts. The judgment decreed that the bank has a valid interest in the vehicle in the sum of $442.92 and that the vehicle is forfeited to the state subject to the interest of the bank.
The issue, then, may be simply stated: Is the interest of the legal owner of an automobile, created bona fide and without knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used in violation of the narcotics laws, to be forfeited to the state where the legal owner failed to make an investigation as to the moral character of the registered owner but where such an investigation would have revealed that the latter did in fact have a good moral character ? I am of the opinion that that question must be answered in the negative and that the judgment in favor of the bank should be affirmed.
There does not appear to be any decisions holding that the legal owner’s interest is forfeited where a useless investigation is not made. The cases cited in the majority opinion (People v. One Pontiac 8 Sedan, 22 Cal.App.2d 503 [ 71 P.2d 302 ]; People v. One 1939 Buick 8 Coupe, 43 Cal.App.2d 411 [ 110 P.2d 1013 ]; People v. One 1936 Pontiac 6 Sedan, 28 Cal.App. 2d 410 [ 82 P.2d 706 ]; People v. One LaSalle Sedan, 23 Cal. App.2d 237 [ 72 P.2d 766 ]) merely hold that the burden of proving the facts necessary to avoid a forfeiture rests upon the lien claimant. There is no question here as to the burden of proof. The facts claimed to establish the bank’s right to maintain its interest as against the state have been proved (that is, that an investigation would have been an idle act) and the only remaining issue is the legal sufficiency of those facts to avoid a forfeiture of the bank’s interest. The decisions holding that the state need not establish that an investigation would have revealed information as to the intended use of the vehicle are not authority for the proposition accepted by the majority that proof by the lien claimant that an investigation would have been an idle act is not a defense to a forfeiture proceeding. Neither are the cases in point which declare the interest of the legal owner forfeited where the latter offered insufficient evidence or no evidence at all that a reasonable investigation was made or that such an investigation would have been useless. (As in People v. One HarleyDavidson Motorcycle, 5 Cal.2d 188 [ 53 P.2d 970 ]; People v. One 1938 Ford Sedan, 98 Cal.App.2d 333 [ 219 P.2d 839 ]; People v. One 1937 Packard 6 Sedan, 50 Cal.App.2d 761 [ 123 *480 P.2d 900 ]; People v. One 1938 Buick Sedan, 39 Cal.App.2d 42 [ 102 P.2d 447 ]; People v. One Packard 6 Sedan, 26 Cal. App.2d 150 [ 79 P.2d 130]; People v. One Lincoln Eight, 12 Cal.App.2d 622 [ 55 P.2d 925 ]; People v. One Ford V8 Sedan, 12 Cal.App.2d 517 [ 55 P.2d 908 ].) In fact, in several of those cases it was apparent that an investigation would have disclosed the bad moral character and reputation of the registered owner. (People v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, supra, 5 Cal.2d 188, 189; People v. One 1938 Buick Sedan, supra, 39 Cal.App.2d 42, 50 .)
In my opinion the trial court properly applied the maxim that the law does not require idle acts. That doctrine is not limited to matters dealing with contractual rights, but it has also been invoked in many cases involving questions of compliance with statutes and statutory construction in order to avoid absurd results. (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 339 [ 74 P.2d 761 ]; Voorhees v. Morse, 1 Cal.2d 179, 192 [34 P.2d 153]; Savings Bank of San Diego County v. Barrett, 126 Cal. 413 [ 58 P. 914 ]; Chapman v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.App.2d 186 [ 79 P.2d 128 ]; Arnaudo v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.2d 671 [ 67 P.2d 700 ]; Scott v. Superior Court, 125 Cal.App. 513 [ 14 P.2d 99 ]; Isleton Canning Co. v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.App. 687 [ 286 P. 447 ]; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Universal Elec. & Gas Co., 94 Cal. App. 343, 348 [ 271 P. 377 ]; Kistner v. Pomeroy, 84 Cal.App. 550 [ 258 P. 619 ]; People v. Putty, 64 Cal.App. 519 [ 222 P. 158 ]; Maionchi v. Nicholini, 1 Cal.App. 690 [ 82 P. 1052 ].) The majority opinion states that the “express terms (of the present statute) may not be nullified or defeated by a maxim or a fiction.” Yet it is conceded that the express terms of the statute have not been applied where the result would be to deprive the registered owner of his property without due process of law. Thus, a judgment decreeing forfeiture of the interests of both the registered and the legal owner was reversed in People v. One 1941 Buick Sport Coupe, 28 Cal.2d 692 [ 171 P.2d 719 ], where the registered owner, who was then in control of the automobile, had no knowledge that an occupant of the automobile was carrying narcotics. In that case the trial court had found that the legal owner had made no investigation of the moral responsibility, character and reputation of the registered owner before the conditional sale contract was executed and the appeal was on the judgment roll. Similarly, a judgment denying forfeiture was affirmed in People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 Sedan, 37 Cal.App.2d 65 *481 [ 98 P.2d 750 ], where the automobile was being used without the consent of the registered owner. The court rejected the contention that the defenses available to the legal owner were restricted to those specified in the statute and it refused to consider the reasonableness of the investigation conducted by the legal owner, holding that the Legislature did not intend to cause a forfeiture of the lien claimant’s interest in the absence of a proper case for forfeiture of the purchaser’s interest. It was said that “The contention of appellant if correct would result in the return of the automobile or vehicle to the purchaser and the destruction of the lienholder’s interest.therein. Such a result is absurd and would serve no useful purpose whatever.” (People v. One 1937 Plymouth 6 Sedan, supra, 37 Cal.App.2d 65, 73 .) Although these two decisions are based upon the principle, as applied to the rights of the registered owner, that a statute should be construed so as to avoid an unconstitutional application if possible (see People v. One 1941 Ford 8 Stake Truck, 26 Cal.2d 503, 506 [ 159 P.2d 641 ]), and even though it be assumed that there are no constitutional obstacles present here, nevertheless such cases illustrate that it is not true that the literal language of the forfeiture provisions of the Health and Safety Code is always to be strictly followed, regardless of the consequences, in determining the rights of the legal owner. The principle pertinent here is that, whenever possible, a statute should be construed so as to avoid absurd results. (23 Cal.Jur. 766.) As was said in Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 142 P.2d 929 ], “it is . . . well settled that statutes and even constitutional enactments must be given a reasonable interpretation, and that a literal construction which will lead to absurd results should not be given if it can be avoided.” Similar expressions may be found in many eases. (Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 32 Cal.2d 620, 630-631 [ 197 P.2d 543 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 321 [ 30 P.2d 417 ]; Robbiano v. Bovet, 218 Cal. 589, 595 [ 24 P.2d 466 ]; Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal.App. 290, 295 [ 14 P.2d 149 ].)
The majority opinion intimates that the legislative policy established by sections 11620 and 11622 of the Health and Safety Code is to withhold automobiles from use by narcotics law violators by inquiry on the part of sellers and mortgagees into the moral character of purchasers and mortgagors of automobiles and that the decision of the trial court would *482 subvert this policy. Two answers to this proposition are readily apparent. First, it is established in this case that the registered owner, Nick Chronis, had a good moral character and he did not violate the narcotics laws in this instance. The offender was Frank Chronis, who was using the automobile with the permission of Nick. If the bank had performed the idle act of making an investigation of the character and reputation of Nick before creating its interest, it would have been justified in extending credit to Nick and there would then be no question as to the validity of the bank’s claim. Hence, such an investigation would not have accomplished the supposed purpose of withholding automobiles from use by persons who violate the narcotics laws. It is evident that the bank’s failure to make the investigation had nothing whatsoever to do with the violation of the law in this case. Secondly, it is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to place in the hands of private financial organizations general problems of crime prevention and the specific matter of keeping automobiles out of the possession of narcotics law violators. If the Legislature had intended to accomplish the latter object it would have placed the matter within the jurisdiction of an appropriate public agency equipped with facilities to investigate the use of motor vehicles and authorized to deal with narcotics law offenders.
The logical consequence of the majority opinion is that the interest of the legal owner will be lost in a forfeiture proceeding if the legal owner did not go through the motions of conducting a useless investigation, even though the legal owner knew that the moral character and reputation of the registered owner was good because of a personal acquaintance with the latter (see People v. One 1939 Plymouth 6 Coupe, 41 Cal.App. 2d 559 [ 107 P.2d 266 ]) or by reason of information volunteered by a third person (see People v. One 1939 Buick Coupe, 56 Cal.App.2d 163 [ 132 P.2d 308 ]). I believe that such an unreasonable interpretation of the statute is neither necessary nor desirable.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.