the general rule is that references to threats or dangers to prosecuting witnesses are improper unless testimony is offered connecting the defendants with the threats
How later courts described this case
- the general rule is that references to threats or dangers to prosecuting witnesses are improper unless testimony is offered connecting the defendants with the threats
- explaining the abolition of the prohibition against testimony by a convicted perjurer
- any prejudice resulting from SLED agent’s testimony concerning the very issue to be decided by the jury was corrected by the trial court’s “very thorough” curative instruction
- admission of the results of witness’s polygraph examination would have been merely cumulative to other evidence impeaching his credibility; thus its exclusion was harmless
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Gardner, Judge
(concurring in result):
I concur in the result because Hines’ testimony was merely cumulative; there was testimony of record by witness Hogg which is the same as that given by Hines.
I, however, cannot agree with the reasoning of my brethren by which they adhere to the published decision — *95 this in spite of the fact that I authored the original opinion. Upon reconsideration I have changed my opinion and now believe that Section 16-9-10 is a viable statute.
In 1914, an en banc hearing of the Supreme Court and circuit judges of this state was held in the case of Nexsen v. Ward, 96 S. C. 313, 80 S. E. 599 (1914). An en banc hearing in Nexsen was called to determine the effect of Section 5 of article 6 of the Constitution of 1895, which provides for a codification of all the general statutes of the state every ten years and that the codes adopted under that provision shall be the only statutory law of the state. The court in Nexsen held that any matter not theretofore a part of the general statutory law of the state, became by virtue of its inclusion in the civil code of 1902, a part of the general statutory law of the state. The court said, “that any matter which the legislature may constitutionally enact as law becomes such when it has been inserted in the Code and adopted with it. ” 96 S. C. at 319, 80 S. E. at 601 . (Emphasis mine.)
It is true, as the majority of this decision notes, that Act No. 632 of 1934 (currently codified as Section 19-11-60 of the 1976 Code) contains an express repealer and therefore repealed Section 16-9-10 from the enactment of Act No. 632 of 1934 until the adoption of the 1942 Code; nevertheless, under Nexsen , upon the adoption of 1942, Code 1 of Laws of South Carolina, Section 16-9-10 was reenacted and now, in the opinion of the writer, is a viable statute.
As noted, however, I concur with my brethren of the majority because Hines’ testimony was merely cumulative.
This statute was recodified in 1952, in 1963 (in which code it is cross-indexed with Section 19-11-60) and in 1976. It has thus been reenacted by legislative adoption of four South Carolina Codes.