The opinion
Judge BECTON,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s resolution of the joinder and non-suit issues. Believing that the majority reads G.S. 15A-1025 too narrowly and, thus, thwarts the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of G.S. 15A-1025, I dissent.
*508 The relevant statute reads:
The fact that the defendant or his counsel and the prosecution engaged in plea discussions or made a plea arrangement may not be received in evidence against or in favor of the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceedings.
G.S. 15A-1025. Finding that “[n]o evidence of plea discussions or arrangements was offered by the State or by defendant” and “that the trial judge’s statements [do not] constitute an expression of opinion ...” the majority concludes “that no violation of G.S. 15A-1025 occurred in the present case.” Ante, p. 4. In my view, the fact of plea discussions and plea arrangements is inadmissible in this criminal proceeding. The obvious and primary legislative concern in enacting G.S. 15A-1025 was the prejudice that occurs when a jury is told during trial that the defendant has decided to plead guilty. The vice is in telling the jury this, not in the method by which jurors are told. And even when incriminating statements are made in the course of plea negotiations by a defendant, our Supreme Court has suggested that the incriminating statements might be inadmissible if the fact of plea bargaining has been revealed. See State v. Jenkins, 292 N.C. 179, 188 , 232 S.E. 2d 648, 654 (1977) (dictum) (“[W]e do not think that the District Attorney’s questions, which tended to impeach defendant’s testimony by showing a contradictory statement, would violate the provisions of the statute unless the fact of plea bargaining was revealed.”)
In addition to my belief that the legislature intended to keep from the jury all references to prior plea negotiations, whether by introduction of formal evidence or otherwise, I believe that there are practical reasons suggesting how the defendant was prejudiced in this case. The testimony of a witness concerning plea arrangements may not be nearly as compelling as the trial judge’s statement that the defendant has negotiated with the State to plead guilty and is now filling out the transcript of plea, since, in the first instance, the witness would be subjected to cross examination and the resulting balancing process by the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the testimony.
In this case, the State put on strong and compelling evidence of defendant’s guilt before resting its case. The trial judge then said to the jury:
*509 Members of the Jury, the defendants in the case that we are trying have negotiated with the State to enter please [sic] to the charges that have [been] placed against them. What they are doing right now is filling out the transcripts of pleas, and it will take them a while since there are six defendants. We are going to start the next case. [Emphasis added.]
Few things could be more prejudicial than the quoted statement by the trial judge and the following statement by the trial judge which was given when the jury returned to the courtroom:
. . . Members of the Jury, during the interim, the defendants, Joyce Ann Parker, Lorraine Cooper, Ruth Parker, Jarvis Finch, and Ronnie Parker changed their plea of not guilty to nolo contendere. Thereafter, it will be unnecessary for you to determine the guilt or innocence against those five people. In the case of Allen Melvin, the charges against him which we will pursue will be assault with attempt to inflict serious injury and common law robbery. We will proceed with those two charges against the defendant.
Although the trial court sought, commendably, only to inform the jurors of the status of the cases being tried, the trial court, inadvertently, prejudiced the defendant by his remarks.
For the reasons stated, I believe the defendant is entitled to a new trial.