The opinion
Hill, J.
(concurring)—The majority opinion correctly disposes of the assignments of error, and I can and do concur therein. But from a realistic point of view, I strongly suspect that the legislative committee, in the James and companion cases, asked the question which resulted in the proceedings before us, not for the purpose of securing data *914 necessary for the framing of legislation to meet the problem of dealing with their subversive activities, but for the harassing effect on political dissidents and for public information. However, one cannot decide cases on suspicion, no matter how strong.
My principal uncertainty in this case centers around the view that the legislature’s right to investigate is limited by its power to legislate, and that it is not, as Wigmore points out, a grand jury. 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) 80, § 2195. It follows that, if the legislature could enact no valid legislation governing the personal beliefs of an individual, a question compelling the disclosure of such beliefs might not be within the scope of legitimate inquiry. As Mr. Justice Jackson said in the opinion of the court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 , 63 S. Ct. 1178 :
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”
I do not mean to imply that an individual always has a right to privacy as to his beliefs. If he occupies a position of public trust or confidence, the public might well have the right to compel revelations of such beliefs as are pertinent to the individual’s qualifications and suitability for the position held. Certainly the legislature might be concerned with the extent of the infiltration of communists within our educational and governmental institutions; and, as a basis for a determination of whether legislation is necessary to deal with the problem, the legislature might ask public employees whether or not they are communists.
Mr. James occupied no position as a public employee. However, the question asked Mr'. James was not, Are you or have you ever been a communist, which would have squarely raised the disturbing question, but was as to his membership in the Communist party. There is a distinction between inquiry as to a man’s faith or beliefs, which cannot *915 be the subject of legislation, and his membership in an organization whose activities, propaganda or otherwise, are subject to legislative scrutiny and regulation.
However, this case does highlight some of the dangers inherent in such legislative investigations, and suggests the importance and necessity of more adequate procedural safeguards. I am concerned lest, in our laudable efforts to combat communism, we give our approval to practices and procedures which may later be used against doctors, lawyers, or union business agents, should some future legislature deem them to be subversive groups, endangering our domestic unity, and a proper object of investigation.
The legislative authorization for any inquiry, if it is to be the basis for fining or sending men to prison for failure to answer material questions, should be sufficiently explicit to enable those who are subpoenaed, and the courts which try them on contempt charges, to ascertain whether a question asked is pertinent and material to the inquiry. The authorization should not be vague and uncertain, or create a roving commission for a fishing expedition. Only by reference to the legislative authorization can a witness determine whether a question asked is or is not material to the inquiry. A copy of such legislative authorization should be served, with the subpoena, on any person whose testimony is desired by a legislative committee.
Moreover, it seems that there should be some means by which a citizen might secure a determination of the limits of the powers of investigation of a legislative committee whose scope or constitutionality is uncertain, without having to subject himself to the embarrassment of prosecution on a contempt charge by refusing to answer questions. Wig-more points out that there must be a strict limitation of the power of the legislature to compel testimony, saying:
“Not only does the logic of the legislative needs call for a strict limitation of this power, but also the policy of the situation; for the Legislatures are not bound by, and do not employ, the evidential rules that in judicial trials protect parties and witnesses and check abuses of power. . . .
Moreover, legislative inquiries are sometimes conducted for partisan purposes and personal aggrandizement, and *916 there is a particular temptation to pursue the inquiry beyond the necessities of contemplated legislation and to assume improperly the function of a grand jury.
“The following limitations may therefore be said to apply: (1) The purpose must be to aid legislation, and that only. (2) The scope of topics is limited to data relevant to that purpose. (3) The power can be exercised by a committee delegated for the purpose; but when such a committee has been designated, the delegated power is limited to the committee acting as such. (4) The Judiciary are entitled to define and declare the limitations of the power.” 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) 80, § 2195.
Mallery, J., concurs with Hill, J.