concluding that plaintiff could enforce a covenant against defendant despite lack of express provision to that effect
How later courts described this case
- concluding that plaintiff could enforce a covenant against defendant despite lack of express provision to that effect
- concluding that covenant was intended to benefit land despite the absence of an express statement to that effect
- holding that a covenant was intended to benefit a party not mentioned in the restriction
- "[I]n resolution of doubt in interpretation the instrument must be construed most favorably to the grantee."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Bobbitt, J.,
concurring: A, the owner of certain land, be it a 200-foot lot or a 10-acre tract, decides to sell a portion thereof, e.g., one-half, to B. A’s deed to B sets forth explicitly their agreement, to wit, the imposition of identical restrictive covenants on the portion thereof conveyed to B and on the portion thereof retained by A. The restrictive covenants do not purport to affect any land other than said 200-foot lot or 10-acre tract. Only A and B, and their respective heirs and assigns, are bound by said mutual restrictive covenants.
The deed from A to B is duly recorded. Hence, a subsequent purchaser from A of the portion of said lot or tract retained by A is charged with notice that A has imposed upon it said restrictive covenants.
As I see it, the decisions relating to a uniform plan with reference to restrictive covenants where a developer sells a large number of lots have no application. In such cases, the question ordinarily posed is the enforceability of such restrictive covenants by the purchasers inter se.
In one sense, when A conveys the retained portion of said lot or tract to a subsequent purchaser, A’s deed to B is not in such purchaser’s chain of title, that is, A’s deed to B is not the source of or a link in such purchaser’s title. But in another sense, A’s deed to B is in the purchaser’s chain of title, that is, such subsequent purchaser is charged with notice of such recorded deed in like manner as he would be charged with notice of a recorded deed of trust, judgment or other record lien imposed during the period of A’s ownership. Thus, such purchaser’s title, while it does not pass under A’s deed to B, is limited by the terms of A’s deed to B whereby the restrictive covenants are imposed. The sense in which the expression “chain of title” is used in decided cases must be considered in the light of the facts of each case and in relation to the context in which it is used.
When reasonable restrictive covenants are so imposed my view is that they may be enforced as between A and B, and their respective heirs and assigns, until such time as, by reason of changed conditions, it becomes inequitable to do so.