finding that “Misty’s history revealed her as the equivalent of a ‘dangerous instrumentality’ to children”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “Misty’s history revealed her as the equivalent of a ‘dangerous instrumentality’ to children”
- although the duty to supervise their child may have been limited to the family sphere, parents’ duty to supervise their dog was owed to the world at large
- not in automobile injury cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by BROADBENT BY BROADBENT v. Broadbent, 178 Ariz. 53 (1994)
Specifically, Schleier is limited to its facts and does not stand for the proposition that parents can be sued by their child if that child is harmed by the family pet based on the fact that the dog could be dangerous. 159 Ariz. at 400-01, 767 P.2d at 1190-91.
The opinion
SHELLEY, Judge,
specially concurring:
The record is devoid of any evidence that small children visited the Alter home. Also, there was no evidence that the dog was dangerous to anyone but small children. The duty of the driver of a motor vehicle on a public street is much different than the duty of parents in their own home wherein lawful entry may be made only by invitation. Therefore, I do not think the Streenz world-at-large theory applies in *403 this ease. In Sandoval, our supreme court, in regard to Streenz, stated:
In Streenz, supra, we did not delineate precisely the areas in which parental immunity would continue to be a bar to suit by a minor for the negligence of his parents, though it is apparent that automobile cases are ones in which the doctrine of parental immunity is abolished. This, however, is not an automobile case in the usual sense in that the parent’s obligation did not arise out of his driving of an automobile. The direct cause of Ramero’s injuries was the impact of the Perez automobile, not the act of leaving the gate open. We disinguish this act from the act of the parents in Streenz, supra, in which the parent, as a driver, had a duty to the world at large to drive carefully. If an accident resulted because of the parent’s negligent driving, any passenger in the vehicle could have been injured, and the driver should be liable to that passenger regardless of the fact that the passenger is the child of the driver.
Sandoval, 128 Ariz. at 13, 623 P.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
I concur in the result because the parents were on notice that Misty constituted a grave danger to Rachel. They had a duty to remove that danger from the home. The two Goller exceptions to the abrogation of the doctrine of parental immunity set forth in Streenz are not applicable to the facts of this case. The failure of the parents to act did not involve an exercise of parental authority over the child. Neither did it involve the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. Keeping Misty in the home certainly was not an exercise of ordinary parental discretion. The doctrine of parental immunity cannot be used to protect the parents from the duty to remove Misty, an obvious and known danger, from the home, at least before it bit Rachel for the third time.