holding no error where the trial court failed to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its conclusion to deny the defendant's motion to suppress where the trial court provided its rationale from the bench. (citing State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980)) (vacated in part on other grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 361 N.C. 565, 648 S.E.2d 841 (2007))
How later courts described this case
- holding no error where the trial court failed to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its conclusion to deny the defendant's motion to suppress where the trial court provided its rationale from the bench. (citing State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980)) (vacated in part on other grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 361 N.C. 565, 648 S.E.2d 841 (2007))
- holding no material conflict in the evidence existed where the evidence presented during the suppression hearing consisted of the testimony of law enforcement officers who were cross-examined by defense counsel
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEVINSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except to the extent it vacates those portions of the judgments which purportedly impose attorney fees against Jacobs. The majority reasons that, because Jacobs did not have an opportunity to be heard concerning the number of attorney hours or the total fee, he is entitled to another hearing. This is, in my view, erroneous for two reasons.
*30 First, there has been no appeal from, and the record is completely devoid of, any judgments or orders which require Jacobs to pay attorney fees. The criminal judgments on appeal only provide, “[a] civil judgment is to be placed against defendant for attorney fees.” As there is nothing in the record on appeal to suggest what, if anything, the court ever entered on attorney fees, there is likewise nothing for this Court to address. The majority opinion attempts to vacate, in part, an order that may never have been entered; may have actually been entered only after some subsequent notice and hearing; and may require defendant to pay $0. We cannot know because such an order is not before this Court.
Secondly, the trial court has only indicated its intention to enter a subsequent order. In this regard, the trial court did exactly that which our appellate precedent requires: it declined to enter a civil judgment against defendant for an amount certain until some later time when he would have an opportunity to be heard.