"Although Cargill could be read expansively to apply to every Fred Meyer store in Oregon and, by inference, to every comparable retail store, the Court of Appeals since has made it clear that an expansive reading of Cargill was not intended."
How later courts described this case
- "Although Cargill could be read expansively to apply to every Fred Meyer store in Oregon and, by inference, to every comparable retail store, the Court of Appeals since has made it clear that an expansive reading of Cargill was not intended."
- “Because we decide this issue on a narrow and subconstitutional ground, it is not necessary for this court to draw the line for all time and for all future cases involving claims of constitutional rights to seek signatures on initiative petitions on private property.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38 (2000)
316 Or. 448, 457 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38
The opinion
GILLETTE, J.,
dissenting.
Starting with a bad idea and then trying to expand upon it produces results like that reached in this case. This is a case of a trespasser who indisputably was on private property and was ordered to leave that property by a person who was in charge of the property. The majority nonetheless reverses the trespasser’s conviction for criminal trespass on the ground that the state failed to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the “defense” that the trespasser was engaged in constitutionally protected activity, viz., petition signature gathering. 1 The principal fault with the majority’s approach lies in its unspoken major premise, which is that the activity in question could be (the majority declines to determine that, in this case, it is) constitutionally protected. As I believe that I have demonstrated in Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 315 Or 500, 528-56 , 849 P2d 446 (1993) (Whiffen II) (Gillette, J., dissenting), there is no such constitutional right to gather petition signatures on private property. It follows that the defendant had no “defense” that the state had to disprove, and that his conviction for criminal trespass therefore should be affirmed.
Carson, C. J., and Peterson, J., join in this dissenting opinion.
There is no single majority opinion, but the disposition to which I refer is agreed upon by four members of the court.