"Although Cargill could be read expansively to apply to every Fred Meyer store in Oregon and, by inference, to every comparable retail store, the Court of Appeals since has made it clear that an expansive reading of Cargill was not intended."
How later courts described this case
- "Although Cargill could be read expansively to apply to every Fred Meyer store in Oregon and, by inference, to every comparable retail store, the Court of Appeals since has made it clear that an expansive reading of Cargill was not intended."
- “Because we decide this issue on a narrow and subconstitutional ground, it is not necessary for this court to draw the line for all time and for all future cases involving claims of constitutional rights to seek signatures on initiative petitions on private property.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38 (2000)
316 Or. 448, 457 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38
The opinion
UNIS, J.,
specially concurring.
Defendant was gathering signatures on an initiative petition while standing on the sidewalk (near the main entrance) of the Fred Meyer store, a large privately-owned “one-stop shopping center” open to the public for commercial *471 purposes and located within the 16-acre Raleigh Hills Shopping Center. He was asked to leave by an employee of the store and, when defendant refused, he was arrested for criminal trespass in the second degree. ORS 164.245(1). Defendant raised the defense that he had a constitutional right under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution to stand on the sidewalk for the purpose of collecting signatures on an initiative petition and that, therefore, the order for him to leave was not lawful. 1
In my opinion, the Fred Meyer “one-stop shopping center” located within the Raleigh Hills Shopping Center is sufficiently analogous to the Lloyd Center in Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 315 Or 500 , 849 P2d 446 (1993) (Whiffen II), and to the Clackamas Town Center in Clackamas Town Center Assoc. v. Wolf, 315 Or 557 , 849 P2d 477 (1993), 2 for the purpose of determining defendant’s right to gather signatures on an initiative petition under Article IV, section 1. In Whiffen II, supra, this court held that “persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions in the common areas of the Lloyd Center have a constitutional right to do so under Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions,” 315 Or at 503, based in part on this court’s previous holding in Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 307 Or 674 , 773 P2d 1294 (1989) (Whiffen I), that “ ‘the process of gathering signatures is substantially impaired’ if signature gatherers are not permitted to gather signatures in the common areas of large shopping malls such as the Lloyd Center.” Whiffen II, supra, 315 Or at 512 (referring to holding in Whiffen I, supra).
Based on this court’s holding in Whiffen II, I believe that defendant was engaged in a constitutionally-protected activity and that the trial court erred in ruling that the order for defendant to leave the premises was lawful.
Fadeley, J., joins in this opinion.
Defendant also claimed that the order for him to leave was not lawful under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.
A detailed description of both the place where defendant was seeking signatures and the 16-acre Raleigh Hills Shopping Center is set forth in Justice Van Hoomissen’s opinion. See 316 Or at 451-53 and Appendix.