stating that there is no “federal jurisdiction” under the “FCA [for] actions ‘based on the public disclosure of allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.’ ”, (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2005))
How later courts described this case
- stating that there is no “federal jurisdiction” under the “FCA [for] actions ‘based on the public disclosure of allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.’ ”, (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2005))
- holding public disclosure barred a federal claim that alleged substantially the same conduct as a previously filed state civil action
- stating that “the basis for a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over an action must be apparent from the facts existing at the time the complaint is brought”
- reiterating that “for a qui tam relator to have standing to bring her claim, she ‘must be a true “whistle-blower” ’ ” (quoting United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir.1994))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Azam Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813 (2021)
552 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813
The opinion
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and its analysis of Poteet’s complaint under the public disclosure rule. However, I do not agree with the majority’s further (and entirely unnecessary) discussion of the inapplicability of the first-to-file rule. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the first-to-file rule only bars subsequent complaints filed after a complaint that itself is not barred by the public disclosure rule, Campbell, United States ex rel. v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir.2005), I do not believe that the record in this case provides a sufficient factual basis for concluding that Doe did not qualify as an “original source,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B), and thus that the Doe complaint itself was barred by the public disclosure rule. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of Poteet’s complaint on the basis of the public disclosure rule alone.