finding that introduction of prior felony evidence had “nothing to do with any element of [the other charges], except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes”
How later courts described this case
- finding that introduction of prior felony evidence had “nothing to do with any element of [the other charges], except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes”
- finding that “[tjhere were no limitations imposed by the trial court as to the use to which the jury properly might put the evidence of prior convictions”
- stating in dicta that a curative instruction would be sufficient to avoid harm from admission of prior conviction
- overruled on another ground, Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365 (2) (614 SE2d 31) (2005)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365 (2005)
253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ) (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614 (1986)
Head, supra, is distinguishable on its facts.
The opinion
Bell, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the opinion of the court, except paragraphs (a) and (b) of Division 3. I would hold that in cases where the count charging possession of a firearm is not material to the more serious charge, the trial of the possession charge must be severed and held before a different jury. This would eliminate the danger that evidence of the more serious crime will prejudice the jurors during the subsequent trial of the possession charge, and would also foreclose the possibility that inquiries relative to the possession charge during voir dire will unfavorably affect the defendant during trial of the more serious charge.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall and Justice Smith join in this special concurrence.