finding that introduction of prior felony evidence had “nothing to do with any element of [the other charges], except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes”
How later courts described this case
- finding that introduction of prior felony evidence had “nothing to do with any element of [the other charges], except the forbidden (albeit perhaps the most illuminating) realm of character and propensity for violent crimes”
- finding that “[tjhere were no limitations imposed by the trial court as to the use to which the jury properly might put the evidence of prior convictions”
- stating in dicta that a curative instruction would be sufficient to avoid harm from admission of prior conviction
- overruled on another ground, Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365 (2) (614 SE2d 31) (2005)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365 (2005)
253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ) (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365
Distinguished
Distinguished by Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614 (1986)
Head, supra, is distinguishable on its facts.
The opinion
Hill, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the opinion of the court, except paragraph (d) of Division 3. Although paragraph (d) is procedural, my disagreement with it is substantive.
In my view a person who defends himself or herself against an aggressor’s attack and who, without malice or intent, causes the aggressor’s death in self-defense, should not nevertheless be guilty of felony murder on the basis that such person is guilty of possession (however momentary) of a firearm by a convicted felon. That is to say, in my view, a person should not be denied the right of self-defense because such person is a convicted felon.
As this substantive issue is not before us at this time, I concur in the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Justice Clarke and Justice Smith, join in this special concurrence.