holding that the record contained sufficient evidence “to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted in concert with the traffickers to possess or transport in excess of 10,000 pounds of marijuana”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the record contained sufficient evidence “to support the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted in concert with the traffickers to possess or transport in excess of 10,000 pounds of marijuana”
- clarifying that the reason the “acting in concert” doctrine was inapplicable in State v. Baize, 71 N.C. App. 521, 529, 323 S.E.2d 36, 41 (1984), is because, in Baize, “the drugs in question were in the possession and under the control of a person other than [the defendant], and [the defendant] was not present when the drugs were seized”
- indicating that when the State has established that a defendant was present while a trafficking offense occurred and that he acted in concert with others to commit the offense pursuant to a common plan or purpose, it is not necessary to invoke the doctrine of constructive possession
- stating that there is no way for the Court to know whether “some jurors found that defendant possessed [the drugs] . . . and some found that he transported [them]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated in part, on other grounds by State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561 (1990)
317 N.C. 545 (1986), abrogated by Hartness, 326 N.C. 561
The opinion
Justice Frye
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent to that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that the State produced substantial evidence that defendant committed the crime charged. The majority relies upon the following facts to support the identification of defendant Diaz as one of the people involved in the activities at the swamp: the phrase “Dias *556 equals Galones” found in what appeared to be a code book, the name “Bienvenido Diaz” typed on the rental receipt for the Buick caught leaving the swamp, and the circumstances of defendant’s arrest. From these facts, the majority concludes first that Diaz “was a participant in the planning of the crime of trafficking in more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana” and second, that he was “present and assisted in the loading, unloading, and transportation of the marijuana.”
First, I am convinced that the facts as presented in this case will not support a reasonable inference that the phrase “Dias equals Galones” had any connection at all with defendant. Defendant’s name is Diaz, not Dias. While this distinction might not appear critical to an English speaker, it might well be critical to a Spanish speaker. As far as is shown in the opinion, the State introduced no evidence on this point. From context, the word “Dias” could be any non-English word; there is not even a suggestion that it is a name. The code read, “One equals Rosalba, two equals Marida, . . . Dias equals Galones.”
Second, the State’s evidence as described in the majority’s opinion will permit only an inference that defendant rented the Buick automobile detained during the raid. The State’s only evidence connecting defendant with the automobile is the name “Bienvenido Diaz” appearing on the rental agreement. No one identified defendant as the person who rented the Buick, the rental agreement was not signed, the purported identifying information was not confirmed as actually identifying defendant, and neither defendant, his personal possessions, nor his fingerprints were found in the automobile. To conclude from the inference that defendant rented the Buick that he also participated in planning the crime would amount to stacking an inference upon an inference. Defendant’s guilt may not be predicated upon such evidence in this state. State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599 , 340 S.E. 2d 309 (1986); State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258 , 150 S.E. 2d 428 (1966).
While the circumstances of defendant’s arrest three days after the raid may be sufficient for the jury to infer that defendant was present at the scene, it would be necessary for the jury to stack inference upon inference for it to further find from these circumstances that defendant also participated in the criminal events of that evening.
*557 I therefore conclude, as did the unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals, that there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury.
Because I believe that the State’s evidence was insufficient to take the case to the jury, I would not reach the second issue discussed by the majority. Nevertheless, since the Court has decided to reach this issue, I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority as to this issue.