The opinion
SPENCE, J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion rests entirely upon the exclusionary rule this day adopted by the majority in People v. Cahan, ante, p. 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 ],
The only material difference between the Cahan case and the present one is that in Cahan the illegality resulted from the absence of any warrant while in the present case a warrant Tías issued which was subsequently found to be technically defective. Here again the record contains abundant evidence to show the guilt of the defendant (see People v. Berger, (Cal.App.) 274 P.2d 514 ), and the trial court properly admitted all of the challenged evidence in accordance with the settled rule in this state prior to the decision in the Cahan case.
*465 For the reasons stated in my dissent in People v. Cahan, ante, p. 434 [ 282 P.2d 905 ], I would affirm the judgment.
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 25, 1955. Shenk, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.