holding that business communities can constitute a neutral or general community
How later courts described this case
- holding that business communities can constitute a neutral or general community
- “[T]here should be no restriction necessarily limited to the community in which the witness sought to be impeached lives, and * * * the realities of our modern, mobile, impersonal society should also recognize that a witness may have a reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he [or she] works and may have impressed on others in that community his [or her] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”
- in child molestation case, both sides called reputation witnesses to impeach the reputation for veracity of the other side's witnesses; the defendant's reputation witness testified to the accuser's reputation within his school community
- factors to consider include the frequency of contact between members of the community, the amount of time a person is known in the community, the role a person plays in the community, and the number of people in the community
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Johnson, J.
(dissenting) — This court has previously adopted an interpretation of ER 608(a), which has been incorporated into the comment to ER 608(a). If this court wants to change the "interpretation" of ER 608(a), it should be done under rule-making authority. The court's recasting of this rule will result in more confusion in the trial courts and more appeals.
This court has clearly defined the scope of "community" under ER 608(a) in State v. Swenson, 62 Wn.2d 259 , 382 P.2d 614 (1963). See also State v. Ternan, 32 Wn.2d 584, 591 , 203 P.2d 342 (1949); State v. Riggs, 32 Wn.2d 281, 284 , 201 P.2d 219 (1949) (citing additional cases for support). In Swenson , the court refused to allow evidence concerning a witness' reputation for truth and veracity among people of *503 her church. When doing so, this court was quite unequivocal in stating that to allow such evidence would have
constituted a breach of the rather strict rules governing character evidence in this jurisdiction. The evidence should have been limited to proof of appellant's general reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which she resided.
(Italics mine.) Swenson, 62 Wn.2d at 282-83 . Swenson subsequently became a cornerstone of ER 608(a) as noted in the comment to that rule:
The rule restricts the use of character evidence for impeachment to evidence of the witness' reputation for truthfulness, in accordance with existing Washington law. See State v. Swenson, 62 Wn.2d 259 , 382 P.2d 614 (1963).
ER 608(a) comment. Thus, Swenson and prior cases have established that reputation evidence is limited to the community where the witness resides. Now, the majority overrules Swenson by allowing "community" to also include "a business or other relevant community". Majority, at 500-01.
As a general rule, adherence to prior decisions is "necessary to preserve the certainty, stability and symmetry of our jurisprudence". State ex rel. Yates-American Mach. Co. v. Superior Court, 147 Wash. 294, 298 , 266 P. 134 (1928). There are indeed cases where the changing times require a court to reconsider a prior decision, but to overrule that prior decision should be a last resort. Otherwise, the courts and practitioners would never be certain of their knowledge of the law.
Since this case concerns the scope of a rule promulgated and interpreted by this court, overruling prior law is not the only alternative, nor do I think it is the best approach to take. The Supreme Court is expressly granted broad rule-making authority concerning the practice of "taking and obtaining evidence". RCW 2.04.190. Specifically, ER 608(a) was created pursuant to that authority. If the rule's interpretation should be changed, relying on the court's rule-making authority to increase the scope of ER 608(a) would promote simplifying the judicial system by limiting the need *504 to reconcile the rule with numerous cases interpreting it throughout the past and present. Furthermore, it would provide a forum for input, discussion and reflection. See GR 9.
The approach taken by the majority, on the other hand, promotes confusion by disrupting an established area of practice without providing adequate guidance on how to proceed. This new interpretation now places on the trial court judge the initial task, on a case-by-case basis, of determining the new parameters of the rule with little guidance from the majority. Thus, the end result will be more confusion and more appeals. This matter is better resolved by the rule-making process.
Utter and Smith, JJ., concur with Johnson, J.