concluding that when the intended mother/egg donor and the gestational carrier had equal claims to maternity under California law, "she who intended to procreate the child — that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own — is the natural mother under California law"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that when the intended mother/egg donor and the gestational carrier had equal claims to maternity under California law, "she who intended to procreate the child — that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own — is the natural mother under California law"
- noting various stereotypes surrounding gestational surrogacy in determining that husband and wife were the “natural parents” of a child born after the woman’s egg was implanted in a surrogate
- noting that a § 7962-compliant gestational surrogacy agreement overcomes and precludes legal presumption and any resulting claim that surrogate birth mother is a legal parent of a child
- statutorily-authorized gestational carrier agreement disclaimer/waiver of parental rights/claims not violative of public policy or federal constitutional equal protection, substantive due process, or implied privacy rights of nonparent surrogate gestational carrier
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ARABIAN, J., Concurring.
I concur in the decision to find under the Uniform Parentage Act that Crispina Calvert is the natural mother of the child she at all times intended to parent and raise as her own with her husband Mark, the child’s natural father. That determination answers the question on which this court granted review, and in my view sufficiently resolves the controversy between the parties to warrant no further analysis. I therefore decline to subscribe to the dictum in which the majority find surrogacy contracts “not . . . inconsistent with public policy.” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 95-97.)
Surrogacy contracts touch upon one of the most, if not the most, sensitive subjects of human endeavor. Not only does the birth of a new generation perpetuate our species, it allows every parent to contribute, both genetically and socially, to our collective understanding of what it means to be human. Every child also offers the opportunity of a unique lifetime relationship, potentially more satisfying and fulfilling than any other pursuit. (See Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 837 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 , 823 P.2d 1216 ].)
*102 The multiplicity of considerations at issue in a surrogacy situation plainly transcend traditional principles of contract law and require careful, nonadversarial analysis. For this reason, I do not think it wise for this court to venture unnecessarily into terrain more appropriately cleared by the Legislature in the first instance. In this regard, the Florida Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations; although the factual context obviously differs, socially and morally it compares in the most profound respects: “Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with complexity and encompasses the interests of the law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of] issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the subject be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and individuals be properly accommodated.” (Satz v. Perlmutter (Fla. 1980) 379 So.2d 359, 360 , affg. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1978) 362 So.2d 160 .) The New Jersey Supreme Court echoed similar cautionary tones in Matter of Conroy (1985) 98 N.J. 321 [ 486 A.2d 1209 , 48 A.L.R.4th 1 ]: “As an elected body, the Legislature is better able than any other single institution to reflect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the resources and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of fields and to formulate general guidelines that may be applicable to a broad range of situations.” (Id., 486 A.2d at pp. 1220-1221; accord, Matter of Guardianship of Hamlin (1984) 102 Wn.2d 810, 821-822 [ 689 P.2d 1372, 1378-1379 ].)
Clearly, this court should not avoid proper resolution of the issue before it. “[T]he law, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modern technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of.” (In re Quinlan (1976) 70 N.J. 10, 44 [ 355 A.2d 647, 665 , 79 A.L.R.3d 205 ], cert. den. sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 289 , 97 S.Ct. 319 ].) Nevertheless, I would not move beyond the available legal mechanism into such socially and morally uncharted waters. The implications of addressing the general soundness of surrogacy contracts are vast and profound. To date, the legislative process has failed to produce a satisfactory answer. This court should be chastened and not emboldened by that failure.