holding that evidence which showed that the "defendant was present on the premises when the cocaine was found," along with other evidence, constituted evidence of "other incriminating circumstances"
How later courts described this case
- holding that evidence which showed that the "defendant was present on the premises when the cocaine was found," along with other evidence, constituted evidence of "other incriminating circumstances"
- upholding a conviction for maintaining a dwelling used for the keeping or selling of controlled substances based on evidence showing that the defendant cooked dinner and resided in the house where the drugs were found
- indicating an intent to sell or deliver drugs was established where twenty grams of cocaine was found along with a chemical used for diluting cocaine and one hundred small plastic bags in close proximity to the cocaine
- evidence of "materials related to the use and sale of cocaine," which included two bags of cocaine of differing levels of purity, numerous small plastic bags, and tools "commonly used in repackaging and selling cocaine," was sufficient to sustain conviction for maintaining dwelling for purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Judge Wells
dissenting.
In State v. McLaurin, 320 N.C. 143 , 357 S.E. 2d 636 (1987), our Supreme Court held that where the defendant’s control of the premises was nonexclusive, there must be other incriminating circumstances (such as close proximity to the contraband found on the premises) to establish constructive possession. The only distinction I can discern between the essential facts in McLaurin and the facts in this case is that in this case defendant was physically present on the premises when the contraband was found. I am not persuaded that this is a sufficient difference for us to distinguish this case from McLaurin . Taking the position that the evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession by defendant, I vote to vacate defendant’s convictions.