stating that “[sjearches and seizures are separate acts calling for separate analysis” and that “[i]f the police violated any right of [the] defendant’s, it was a right against the search that uncovered the effects, not some right in the effects themselves”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[sjearches and seizures are separate acts calling for separate analysis” and that “[i]f the police violated any right of [the] defendant’s, it was a right against the search that uncovered the effects, not some right in the effects themselves”
- holding that, when a person entrusts effects to another, and the police discover those effects in the other’s home by means of a search that *24 violates Article I, section 9, the search also violates the entrustor’s rights under Article I, section 9
- concluding that the defendant retained a privacy interest in items that he entrusted to friends as security for a loan so that, when an unlawful search of the friends’ home uncovered the defendant’s property, his privacy interests were violated
- holding that a defendant who had pledged property, which turned out to be stolen, had a right to reclaim the pledged property and had not abandoned the property for the purpose of the Article I, section 9, analysis of defendant’s privacy rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PETERSON, C. J.,
dissenting.
I join in the dissent of Jones, J., but wish to make these specific comments.
The exclusionary rule is a court-made sanction stemming from the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The scope of the rule should be limited by its purpose.
*326 The purpose of the rule is to deter unreasonable searches and seizures. “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair.” Elkins v. United States, 364 US 206, 217 , 80 S Ct 1437 , 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960). I am fearful that the resúlt of the majority’s decision will be to exclude relevant evidence in situations where there is neither need nor justification for exclusion.
I am not sure that Jones, J., is correct in saying that the majority’s approach will “[viscerate] the reason for an exclusionary rule” or “will lead to suggestions that the exclusionary rule should not operate when there are ‘adequate’ alternatives.” 304 Or at 341. Except for that concern, I join in the dissent.