stating that “[sjearches and seizures are separate acts calling for separate analysis” and that “[i]f the police violated any right of [the] defendant’s, it was a right against the search that uncovered the effects, not some right in the effects themselves”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[sjearches and seizures are separate acts calling for separate analysis” and that “[i]f the police violated any right of [the] defendant’s, it was a right against the search that uncovered the effects, not some right in the effects themselves”
- holding that, when a person entrusts effects to another, and the police discover those effects in the other’s home by means of a search that *24 violates Article I, section 9, the search also violates the entrustor’s rights under Article I, section 9
- concluding that the defendant retained a privacy interest in items that he entrusted to friends as security for a loan so that, when an unlawful search of the friends’ home uncovered the defendant’s property, his privacy interests were violated
- holding that a defendant who had pledged property, which turned out to be stolen, had a right to reclaim the pledged property and had not abandoned the property for the purpose of the Article I, section 9, analysis of defendant’s privacy rights
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CAMPBELL, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion. In State v. Davis, 295 Or 227 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) I joined in an opinion by then Associate Justice Peterson where he dissented in part and concurred in part. Among other things, he said:
*324 “I also disassociate myself from the exclusionary rule discussion on pages 230-37 of the majority opinion. The basis for the majority’s holding is that the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated. The evidence therefore should be excluded. The discussion and holding beginning on page 231 with Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383 , 34 S Ct 341 , 58 L Ed 652 (1914), and ending on page 237 with State v. Laundy, 103 Or 443 , 204 P 958 , 206 P 290 (1922), is unnecessary.”
295 Or at 257-58 .
I still agree that the dictum on pages 230-37 of the Davis opinion was unnecessary. However, it was a correct statement of the law and for that reason I have no hesitation in joining the majority in this case.