reversing summary judgment to shareholder, director, and officer of company on personal liability where evidence showed he oversaw subcontract work, personally performed some repair work, and personally responded when called by plaintiffs
How later courts described this case
- reversing summary judgment to shareholder, director, and officer of company on personal liability where evidence showed he oversaw subcontract work, personally performed some repair work, and personally responded when called by plaintiffs
- reversing grant of summary judgment to corporate officer on claim of negligent construction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the affirmance of summary judgment to Linda Rentz because she had no involvement whatsoever in the construction of the roof and basement, of which plaintiffs complain, and because there is no evidence that she misrepresented their condition.
As to Lonnie Rentz, appellants do not contend that he is personally liable as a corporate officer. The theory advanced by plaintiffs below was, instead, that he acted individually, as general contractor, and entered into the sales contract individually. There is some evidence of this, such as his signing the sales contract “Lonnie S. Rentz (Seller)” above the typed line “Lonnie S. Rentz (Rentz Buildings, Inc.)”; signing the addendum to the contract virtually the same way; signing both a mortgage document and the amendment to contract to sell merely as “Lonnie S. Rentz” above the typed line “Seller.” In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that although plaintiffs had an opportunity to pierce the corporate veil, they did not do so. This was the basis for granting summary judgment to Lonnie as an individual.
On appeal, plaintiffs enumerate this judgment as error “in that the trial court found that Lonnie S. Rentz acted as an agent and not *278 as an individual in the sale and construction of’ their home. Their sole argument, and the cases they cite, relate to the piercing of the corporate veil. The theory on which the majority bases its decision was not advanced by appellants and should not be volunteered by the court. We will not even review issues raised by appellants in their enumerations of error which are not raised and ruled on by the trial court. Thornton v. Ware County Hosp. Auth., 205 Ga. App. 202, 204 ( 421 SE2d 713 ) (1992). Only grounds raised and ruled on below are subject to review at this appellate stage. James v. State, 204 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 420 SE2d 383 ) (1992).
Decided March 4, 1994.
Garner & Still, Dennis T. Still, for appellants.
Ray B. Burrus, Jr., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Alfred A. Lindseth, Dulaney L. O’Roark III, King, Taylor & Stovall, James F. Stovall III, for appellees.
Plaintiffs do not seek to impose liability on Lonnie on the theory now imported for them, by the majority, into review of the summary judgment proceeding; this is a practice which reaches beyond the court’s review function into the realm of advocacy.
Since there is some evidence that, as stated in a case cited by appellants, “the corporation serve [d] as the alter ego or business conduit of its owner,” summary judgment in favor of Lonnie was error. Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 844 (2) (a) ( 392 SE2d 37 ) (1990). See also Smith v. Hawks, 182 Ga. App. 379, 384 (4) ( 355 SE2d 669 ) (1987), another case relied on by appellants.