grocery store customer not entitled to bring action pursuant to § 25-2-318 against ice vendor
How later courts described this case
- grocery store customer not entitled to bring action pursuant to § 25-2-318 against ice vendor
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Judge Greene
dissenting.
I agree with the majority for the reasons given that Food Lion’s appeal must be dismissed. I disagree, however, with the broad assertion that all independent contractors are absolved from liability once their work is “completed and accepted” and that the summary judgment for Triangle Ice must therefore be affirmed.
The North Carolina courts have applied the “completed and accepted” rule only in the context of contracts for construction *766 or repair, 1 see Price v. Johnston Cotton Co., 226 N.C. 758 , 40 S.E.2d 344 (1946) (construction of scaffold); Williams v. Charles Stores Co., Inc., 209 N.C. 591 , 184 S.E. 496 (1936) (repair of gas lamp); Willis v. J.G. White & Co., 150 N.C. 199 , 63 S.E. 942 (1909) (construction of roadbed and railway track), and there is no justification for extending its application to the delivery of goods. The proper test of the liability of Triangle Ice requires application of general principles of negligence, that is, all persons are held to a standard of reasonable care for the protection of third parties who may foreseeably be endangered by a negligent act. Thus the issue presented in this case is whether Triangle Ice’s negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The question of proximate cause requires a determination of whether Food Lion’s negligence, if any, is an intervening cause of plaintiff’s injuries and therefore insulates Triangle Ice from any liability. See Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 233-38 , 311 S.E.2d 559, 565-67 (1984). There are genuine issues of material fact on each of these issues and summary judgment for Triangle Ice was accordingly inappropriate. I would therefore reverse entry of summary judgment for Triangle Ice and remand.
. Many courts have completely abandoned the “completed and accepted” rule, even in the context of construction contracts. See, e.g., Kapalczynski v. Globe Constr. Co., 172 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. App. 1969); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 104A, at 723 (5th ed. 1984) (“It is now the almost universal rule that the contractor is liable to all those who may foreseeably be injured by the structure, not only when he fails to disclose conditions known by him, but also when the work is negligently done.”).