The opinion
*748 Judge LEWIS
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The violation was not so egregious as to warrant so harsh a penalty when there was no evidence whatever of harm to the environment.
The majority interprets the phrase “degree and extent of harm” in former N.C.G.S. § 143-215.6(a)(3) to include damage to the regulatory program resulting from willful violations of environmental standards. By expanding the meaning of the statute to encompass “harm” to the regulatory program, the majority creates a new standard for penalizing willful violations even absent physical damage or harm to the environment. Although the majority qualifies the opinion by stating that not every violation without actual harm would justify the maximum penalty, it provides no clear guidelines for how the standard should be applied. The opinion would, I believe, create an arbitrary basis for maximizing any willful violation.
I agree with the Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute concluding that:
the word [harm] means, at most, proven specific damage to the environment or persons or proven specific damage to the enforcement of the statute other than a simple willful violation.
The trial judge made proper findings under this interpretation in reversing the assessment of the maximum penalty. I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court and therefore respectfully dissent.