holding that FMLA leave was not available to care for an employee’s newborn grandchild while the baby’s mother (the employee’s 18-year-old daughter) suffered from a short-term bout with postpartum depression, both because the employee’s adult child was not incapable of self-care (i.e., not under a “mental or physical disability”) and because the statute does not cover care of grandchildren
How later courts described this case
- holding that FMLA leave was not available to care for an employee’s newborn grandchild while the baby’s mother (the employee’s 18-year-old daughter) suffered from a short-term bout with postpartum depression, both because the employee’s adult child was not incapable of self-care (i.e., not under a “mental or physical disability”) and because the statute does not cover care of grandchildren
- recognizing that “other courts will impose [the duty to inform the employee of a deficiency in a certification and provide a reasonable opportunity to cure] on employers when the FMLA certification is merely ‘inadequate,’ rather than ‘incomplete’ ”
- holding that a medical certification form under a related FMLA provision is insufficient where it lacks a statement of “the appropriate medical facts within the healthcare provider’s knowledge” to support the FMLA claim
- noting that the nearly identical permissive language in 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(1) regarding the employer’s right to demand a second certification does not “requir[e] an employer to obtain a second opinion or else waive any future opportunity to contest the validity of the [first] certification”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HEYBURN, Chief District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the analysis and result in Judge Batchelder’s opinion, except that I do not express an opinion concerning the standard adopted in Section II.A.2. of that opinion. Judge Batchelder adopts a standard whereby short-term restrictions on major life activities generally do not constitute a disability under the FMLA. Judge Merritt would adopt the standard set forth in Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir.2001). I find it unnecessary to take either side in order to resolve this case, because I conclude, as have my two fellow judges, that Novak has met neither standard.