The opinion
GRABER, P. J.
pro tempore, concurring.
I agree that we should affirm, but I write separately to state more precisely the issue and my view of its proper resolution.
The majority correctly notes that we review the Board’s determination of good cause for substantial evidence and errors of law. ORS 656.298(6). There is only one material finding of fact that we must review for substantial evidence: “[T]hat, despite reasonable diligence, claimant did not receive actual notification of the denial until he received the second letter on November 4, 1985.” I agree with the majority that substantial evidence in the record supports that finding.
The Board concluded that nonreceipt was good cause *334 for claimant’s delay in filing the hearing request, reasoning that he could not be expected to file a request for hearing on a denial that he had not yet received. See Hempel v. SAIF, 100 Or App 68, 70 , 784 P2d 1111 (1990). The sole legal issue is whether the Board’s conclusion erroneously interpreted a provision of law. Employer contends that the finding of non-receipt is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute “good cause” under ORS 656.319(1)(b).
More specifically, employer asserts that Norton v. Compensation Department, 252 Or 75 , 448 P2d 382 (1968), precludes the Board’s interpretation of good cause. Employer is wrong, because Norton did not answer the question here: whether nonreceipt of the notice of denial can be good cause. Norton held that the 60-day period for measuring the timeliness of a claimant’s request for hearing runs from the mailing of the notice. It also held that mailing creates a presumption of receipt. The Board’s conclusion in the present case is not inconsistent with either of those principles.
Norton did not contain either of the holdings that employer ascribes to it. It did not make the presumption of receipt conclusive, as distinct from rebuttable, and it did not decide what the result would be if a particular claimant overcomes the presumption of receipt. The strongest evidence that the Board was correct on those two points is found in Norton itself:
“It is, of course, conceivable that the mailing of the notice of denial will not bring notice of the denial to the workman within 60 days after the denial or will not bring notice within a reasonably substantial time after the mailing, all through no fault of the workman. What relief can be granted to the workman in such event will have to depend upon the particular circumstances of each case.” 252 Or at 78 .
The majority cleanly disposes of employer’s final argument, which rests on Wright v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 97 Or App 45 , 775 P2d 857 , rev den 308 Or 466 (1989). There, we held that a request for hearing filed more than 180 days after the mailing of the denial could not be timely. Because the present request was filed more than 60, but less than 180, days after employer mailed the denial, Wright does not apply.
Accordingly, the Board’s conclusion that claimant *335 demonstrated good cause under the statute is consistent with the governing statutes and cases. We must affirm.