stating that a prima facie case is established if the defendant shows "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (8) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process"
How later courts described this case
- stating that a prima facie case is established if the defendant shows "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (8) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process"
- suggesting that bolstering witness is not improper in stating “it is clear that [the remarks] were intended to bolster [State witness’s] credibility and were not intended to contrast her decision to testify with defendant’s choice to remain silent.”
- holding that blacks and Asians are not numerous enough in Salt Lake County to constitute a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes
- discussing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5- 202(1), the Utah capital murder statute in effect at the time of the murder and the trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14 (2003)
Putting aside the possible differences in the language and legislative histories of the statutes in Utah, Mississippi and New York, we respectfully disagree with the rationale expressed in Tillman and Smith.41 As for Parker and Williams, we note that our statute—like those in Arkansas and Delaware—
The opinion
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur with the majority in parts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, IX, X, and XI. I dissent from parts VII and VIII and join Justice Durham’s opinion as it regards the analysis of the unanimity and merger questions. I also agree with her that with respect to the merger issue, the failure of the State to charge and prove legally sufficient aggravating circumstances requires that the death penalty be reversed, that the conviction be reduced to second degree murder, and that the matter be remanded for sentencing.