stating that a prima facie case is established if the defendant shows "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (8) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process"
How later courts described this case
- stating that a prima facie case is established if the defendant shows "(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinetive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (8) that this underrepre-sentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process"
- suggesting that bolstering witness is not improper in stating “it is clear that [the remarks] were intended to bolster [State witness’s] credibility and were not intended to contrast her decision to testify with defendant’s choice to remain silent.”
- holding that blacks and Asians are not numerous enough in Salt Lake County to constitute a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes
- discussing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5- 202(1), the Utah capital murder statute in effect at the time of the murder and the trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by People v. Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14 (2003)
Putting aside the possible differences in the language and legislative histories of the statutes in Utah, Mississippi and New York, we respectfully disagree with the rationale expressed in Tillman and Smith.41 As for Parker and Williams, we note that our statute—like those in Arkansas and Delaware—
The opinion
HOWE, Justice:
(concurring in the result).
I concur except I concur only in the result of parts VII and VIII.
I concur in the result of Part VII on the basis of the analysis of the unanimity rule in State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987). Although the instant case does not involve the defendant’s mens rea as in State v. Russell, in that case we approved the rule of People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122 , 65 N.E. 989 (1903), which held that the jury does not have to be unanimous on the precise manner in which the crime was committed, or by which of several alternative methods or modes, or under which interpretation of the evidence so long as there is substantial evidence to support each of the methods, modes, or manners charged. I cannot accept the implication in the majority opinion that had the defendant requested separate verdict forms requiring the jury to be unanimous as to what felony he was in the course of committing when the homicide took place, he would have been entitled to such a verdict. State v. Russell, supra, held that the defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed that they must be unanimous as to the defendant’s mens rea. That holding likewise applies here where we are concerned with the manner in which the killing occurred.
*583 As to Part VIII, I base my concurrence on State v. Johnson, 740 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1987), where we employed the res gestae analysis which we adopted in State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 464 , 511 P.2d 733 (1973). Under that analysis, it is sufficient if the killing is directly associated with the felony as part of one continuous, interrelated occurrence. See the cases cited and discussed in State v. Johnson, supra, State v. Dudrey, 30 Wash.App. 447 , 635 P.2d 750 (1981), and State v. Richmond, 112 Ariz. 228 , 540 P.2d 700 (1975). The same reasoning applies to the arson which immediately followed the attack on the victim.