noting that the legislature has taken no action to abrogate de facto parentage
How later courts described this case
- noting that the legislature has taken no action to abrogate de facto parentage
- recognizing that threatened use is not included in the definition of first degree robbery
- "|T]he effect upon the victim is the same whether the deadly weapon is actually seen or merely described, by removing the possibility of self- defense.”
- Utter and Goodloe, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concurring with Dolliver, J.; four justices dissented on issues not relevant to this quote
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Goodloe, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority opinion in all respects. I write separately only to address the dissent's concern that Coe's conviction on count 3 (Harmia) should be reversed due to cumulative taint from the admission of improper posthypnotic testimony on counts 5 and 6. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the admission of this improper testimony in any way prejudiced Coe's conviction on count 3. The jury was told to consider each count separately, and a jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 499 , 647 P.2d 6 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211 (1983). The lack of prejudice in this case is demonstrated by the fact that the jury failed to convict Coe on one of the charged counts. This demonstrates that the jury was able to consider each count independently as it had been instructed. Absent a showing of prejudice, I see no reason to reverse Coe's conviction on count 3 for the rape of Julie Harmia.