stating that the offense of common-law robbery is complete once “the thief succeeds in removing the stolen property from the victim’s possession”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the offense of common-law robbery is complete once “the thief succeeds in removing the stolen property from the victim’s possession”
- observing that the taking for purposes of armed robbery in Hope occurred when “the defendant departed from the store with the coat”
- first citing State v. Pridgen, 313 N.C. 80 , 94–95, 326 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1985); then citing State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504 , 279 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1981)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Mitchell
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I am unable to concur fully, however, in the majority’s reasoning in Part II. D. of its opinion.
We have previously indicated that in armed robbery cases, the exact time relationship between the violence and the actual taking is unimportant. State v. Hope, 317 N.C. 302, 305-06 , 345 S.E. 2d 361, 363-64 (1986). We have held, instead, that “[i]n this jurisdiction to be found guilty of armed robbery, the defendant’s use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon must precede or be concomitant with the taking, or be so joined with it in a continuous transaction by time and circumstances as to be inseparable.” Id. at —, 345 S.E. 2d at 364 (emphasis added). I believe the majority’s apparent attempt to establish the exact moment when the taking was complete in the present case to be unwise and entirely unnecessary, since under Hope the exact time of the taking is unimportant. The majority’s conclusion that the State produced suf *114 ficient evidence in this case to show that “the elements of violence and taking were part of ‘one continuing transaction with the elements of violence and of taking so joined in time and circumstances with the taking as to be inseparable’ ” is entirely sufficient to support its holding. The majority’s statements in Part II. D. concerning the time at which the taking was over will simply add confusion to this area of the law, in my view, and are of no significance in resolving the issue at hand. I do not join in those statements which I view as mere obiter dicta.
Justices Meyer and MARTIN join in this concurring opinion.