stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes . . . the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution."
How later courts described this case
- stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes . . . the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution."
- “Management and control of the public schools is a matter of 6 state, not local, care and supervision. . . . Local districts are the State’s agents for local 7 operation of the common school system and the State’s ultimate responsibility for public 8 education cannot be delegated to any other entity.”
- conc, and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion.
However, I cannot embrace the ill-advised concession that the trial court’s order “did pose a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative branch” although the degree of potential disruption “is not great” and the purported infringement on the legislative function is “not substantial.” (Kennard, J., post, conc, and dis. opn. at pp. 710, 711.)
The theory of potential interference with legislative functions to any extent is inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion that the funds used for the emergency loan were “reasonably related” to the educational purposes of the legislation, and, indeed, “the trial court’s order furthered, rather than defeated, that valid legislative purpose.” As persuasively observed in footnote 2, the “funds were appropriated for purposes reasonably and closely related *706 to the purpose for which the trial court ordered them to be used.” (Kennard, J., post, conc. and dis. opn. at p. 711.)
Under the foregoing circumstances—with which I agree—there cannot be some conceptual interference, even though “not great,” with the functions of the legislative branch.
With that caveat, I join the concurring and dissenting opinion.