stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes . . . the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution."
How later courts described this case
- stating that while "[school] districts are separate political entities for some purposes . . . the existence of th[e] local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution."
- “Management and control of the public schools is a matter of 6 state, not local, care and supervision. . . . Local districts are the State’s agents for local 7 operation of the common school system and the State’s ultimate responsibility for public 8 education cannot be delegated to any other entity.”
- conc, and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUCAS, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s conclusions regarding the constitutional obligations of the State of California (State) to assure educational equality. I would not, however, address the propriety of the sources approved by the trial court to provide an emergency loan.
In my view, we need not consider questions regarding the use of the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) emergency appropriation or the unused appropriation for the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program because the issues are moot and their resolution will have no impact on the status quo in this case. As the majority notes, at the May 2, 1991, proceeding, the State continued to object to the trial court’s order arising out of the April 29,1991, hearing. That order required the State, Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and Controller, at their discretion and “by whatever means they deem appropriate,” to ensure Richmond students were not deprived of six weeks of education provided to other students within California. In addition to renewing its basic position on the merits of the *705 constitutional arguments, the State also objected to use of the specific funds proposed by the SPI and Controller. It offered no alternative sources of funding and appealed from both orders.
Before us, however, the State does not demand rescission of the court-approved loan or any change in the status of that funding. The funding was granted as a loan and a loan repayment agreement has been worked out by the parties. The State, acknowledging those facts, expressly asserts “We do not argue that the Controller must be compelled immediately to recover the money.” In other words, it seeks no relief from the trial court’s order granting payment from the challenged sources and compelling repayment of the funds under a prescribed repayment schedule.
Accordingly, as the SPI observes, the matter is moot. The State’s response, found in its reply brief, is only that “the trial court in the next case will still be guided by, unless this court disapproves the test, the ‘generally related’ test set forth in Carmel Valley [Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 540-541 ( 234 Cal.Rptr. 795 )] and Long Beach [Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 181-182 ( 275 Cal.Rptr. 449 )].” It does not assert that this issue is capable of evading review because of timing or that a present controversy over the use of these particular funds still exists. Instead, it seeks guidance only for the future. I would decline to render what would essentially be an advisory opinion here. (See People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 670 , 464 P.2d 126 ] [“The rendering of advisory opinions falls within neither the functions nor the jurisdiction of this court”].)