Opinion

Browne v. Browne

  • 101 N.C. App. 617
  • 400 S.E.2d 736
  • 1991 N.C. App. LEXIS 141
Court
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Filed
Feb 19, 1991
Status
Published
Author
Cozort
On the bench
Greene, Parker, Cozort
Cited by
25 cases

absent a request for deviation, support “consistent with the guidelines is conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance”

How later courts described this case

  • absent a request for deviation, support “consistent with the guidelines is conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance”
  • under the Guidelines and absent request, trial court is not required to make findings of fact or enter conclusions of law “ ‘relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to [pay or] provide support.’ ”
  • 10 days written notice required
  • notice of request for deviation not required where parties introduce evidence on factors listed in Section 5013.4(c)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Judge COZORT

concurring by separate opinion.

I concur with both ultimate conclusions reached by the majority: (1) that the case must be remanded to set support consistent with the applicable statutes; and (2) that the pendente lite alimony award is not immediately appealable. On the first issue, however, I cannot agree with all of the issues discussed and opinions expressed by the majority.

I note initially that neither party raised at trial or on appeal the issue of whether a timely request was made for hearing evidence *627 and making findings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 (c) (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990). Any discussion of that issue is thus unnecessary to the resolution of this case, especially in light of the majority’s holding that the notice requirement was waived. Furthermore, I am compelled to comment on the majority’s interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5043.4 (c) that “upon request of any party” means ten days’ advance notice. I must disagree. The statute clearly states only “upon request” and makes no provision for advance notice of any duration. If the General Assembly had intended the statute to require advance notice, it could have specified such notice and the length thereof. Thus, on the first issue, I vote simply to reverse the trial court’s order which sets support at a level which varied from the guidelines and to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a new order.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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