holding that California's version of rule 413 was not unconstitutional, in part because review for undue prejudice was still required
How later courts described this case
- holding that California's version of rule 413 was not unconstitutional, in part because review for undue prejudice was still required
- holding that California’s version of rule 413 (continued…
- holding state statute admitting propensity evidence of sex crimes does not violate due process
- rejecting a due process challenge to Cal. Evid.Code § 1108 and stating that the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 “adequately sets forth the controlling principles under section 1108”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*926 BROWN, J., Concurring.
I concur generally in the analysis and conclusions of the majority. I write separately only to disavow the majority’s endorsement of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. pocket pt.) as “adequately set[ting] forth the controlling principles under [Evidence Code] section 1108.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 924; id. at p. 922 [CALJIC No. 2.50.01 “contains language appropriate for cases involving the admission of disposition evidence”]; id. at p. 924 [trial court’s “failure to instruct the jury along the lines of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 . . . was clearly harmless”].) The efficacy of this instruction is not before us. Moreover, the instruction suggests the charged and uncharged sex offenses must be “the same or similar type.” (CALJIC No. 2.50.01, supra.) I perceive no such requirement in Evidence Code section 1108. Rather than endorsing this instruction, I would simply state that a defendant may request the jury be instructed that if it finds the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, that is not sufficient by itself to prove he committed the charged crime, and that the weight and significance of the evidence are for the jury to decide.