holding that California's version of rule 413 was not unconstitutional, in part because review for undue prejudice was still required
How later courts described this case
- holding that California's version of rule 413 was not unconstitutional, in part because review for undue prejudice was still required
- holding that California’s version of rule 413 (continued…
- holding state statute admitting propensity evidence of sex crimes does not violate due process
- rejecting a due process challenge to Cal. Evid.Code § 1108 and stating that the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 “adequately sets forth the controlling principles under section 1108”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment. Although evidence of prior sexual offenses has traditionally been excluded under California law to show propensity, there appears to be no constitutional barrier to its admission; its use does not appear to “ ‘offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” (Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446 [ 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 ].). As the majority emphasize, the trial court must still determine, on a case-by-case basis under Evidence Code section 352, whether the evidence should be excluded as too prejudicial or because it will necessitate an undue consumption of time. The present case, moreover, involves the admission only of convictions for rapes as to which defendant pleaded guilty.
I write separately because I am concerned that the majority leave open troubling questions. What is the procedure if a defendant pleaded not guilty to the previous offenses? Or pleaded guilty, or nolo contendere, but now alleges that he was not, in fact, the perpetrator? I question the majority’s conclusion that defendants in such circumstances “will not be burdened unduly by having to ‘defend’ against these charges.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 916.) Nor, in such circumstances, would judicial efficiency be served. The majority, on this point, again emphasize that in cases like the present circumstance, in which the defendant pleaded guilty, there is no danger of “inefficient sidetracking.” (Ibid.) But what of other cases, when there was no such prior guilty plea and, perhaps, no conviction? Must there be a trial within the trial to ascertain the prior facts? As to the issue of undue prejudice, I am concerned that, under the majority’s analysis, the “careful weighing process” under Evidence Code section 352 would appear to exclude, in every case, the long-standing principle that use of prior offenses to show “propensity” may itself be highly prejudicial.
There are too many unanswered questions for me to concur with the reasoning of the majority opinion. With reluctance, under the present limited circumstances, I concur in the judgment.