The opinion
SHENK, J.
I dissent. In my opinion the legislation under consideration provides for a shortening of the period of redemption fixed by the law in force at the time of the sale for delinquent taxes. The question whether the shortening of that period is a substantial impairment of the redemption-er’s right cannot be answered by the citation of cases which declare that the Legislature may change the method of re *286 demption. It is not the method, but the period of redemption which is involved. Neither may it properly be said that the right of the redemptioner is amplified because he is given more notice when his period of redemption is terminated by public declaration than when it is terminated by sale to a third person. Such a pronouncement assumes the point in issue, namely, that the redemptioner’s right may be cut off at an earlier time than that provided by the law in force at the time of the sale to the state.
The case of South San Joaquin Irrigation District v. Neumiller, 2 Cal.2d 485 [ 42 P.2d 64 ], relied on by the majority, involved only the question whether the state could dispose of its tax-deeded lands at private sale for cash or on credit. The decision in that case was that the redemptioner had no right to the disposition by the state of its tax-deeded lands in any particular way when his right of redemption was not adversely affected. This court there expressly recognized that the question of the legislative power to shorten the period of redemption was not involved.
The rule that the law in force at the time of the sale for delinquent taxes governs the right of redemption and that the shortening of the period of redemption is a substantial impairment of that right has been the law of this state from an early period. It became and has remained a rule of property. Tax deeds have been voided for failure to comply with it, and real property titles have been adjusted on the strength of it. The cases are legion on the subject, a few of which are the following: Teralta Land etc. Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 [ 48 P. 613 , 58 Am.St.Rep. 194 ]; Collier v. Shaffer, 137 Cal. 319, 321 [ 70 P. 177 ]; Johnson v. Taylor, 150 Cal. 201 [ 88 P. 903 , 119 Am.St.Rep. 181 , 10 L.R.A.N.S. 818 ]; Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675 [ 209 P. 892 ]; County of San Diego v. Childs, 217 Cal. 109 [ 17 P.2d 734 ]; Risso v. Crooks, 217 Cal. 219 [17 P.2d 1001]; County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal. 2d 192, 203-205 [ 44 P.2d 340 , 100 A.L.R. 149 ]; King v. Samuel, 7 Cal.App. 55 [93 P. 391]; Wetherbee v. Johnston, 10 Cal.App. 264 [ 101 P. 802 ]; Main v. Thornton, 20 Cal.App. 194 [ 128 P. 766 ].
The peremptory writ should be denied.
Curtis, J., concurred.