The opinion
EDMONDS, J. concurring.
I agree that a delinquent taxpayer has no vested right in an existing procedure for the collection of taxes. (Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 371 [ 61 S.Ct. 938 , 85 L.Ed. 1404 ]; League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 [ 22 S.Ct. 475 , 46 L.Ed. 478 ].) There is no contract between him and the state that the latter will not vary the method of. *279 collection. (Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371 ; League v. Texas, supra, p. 158 .) Nor does a statute changing the procedure for the collection of unpaid taxes conflict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution merely because it is retroactive in operation. (League v. Texas, supra, p. 161 ; Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371 .) For these reasons the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a state constitutionally may impose interest upon delinquent taxes by a law enacted subsequent to the time of their accrual. (League v. Texas, supra.)
The due process clause does, however, prevent the state from taking one’s liberty or property in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner. The private ownership of real property normally does not exist by virtue of a statutory grant, and the owner is entitled to notice of the fact that his property will be forfeited if he is delinquent in his obligations to the state. Prior to the enactment of the 1941 legislation, under the law governing the collection of taxes, the landowner was informed that only certain rights in his property immediately would be taken if he failed to pay the taxes levied upon it when due; that certain additional rights would be taken upon a default in payment of his tax obligations during the next five years, and his title forfeited if he did not pay the accrued amounts before the property was sold for taxes by the state to another. (Rev. & Tax. Code, pts. 6, 7.) And although no constitutional limitation requires the state to abide by these conditions for the collection of the tax, procedural due process demands that it must, in altering the procedure, give adequate notice of the change so as to afford the taxpayer a fair opportunity to prevent forfeiture of his property. (Wood v. Lovett, supra, p. 371 ; League v. Texas, supra, p. 158 ; and see Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 [ 50 S.Ct. 451 , 74 L.Ed. 1107 ].)
Sections 3571-78 of the Revenue & Taxation Code are in accord with these principles. They do not arbitrarily deprive the delinquent taxpayer of his remaining interest in his property but afford him adequate notice that his rights will be terminated if he does not cure his default within a period which affords him a fair opportunity to prevent the forfeiture. The Constitution requires nothing more in this regard.
I am not, however, convinced that the new legislation has improved the delinquent taxpayer’s position or conferred upon him benefits equally as advantageous as those existing *280 under the prior procedure. To me, the declaration of Mr. Justice Traynor to this effect is patently inconsistent with his statement that the new policy embodies a plan to classify and rehabilitate tax-deeded property by expediting the restoration of real property to the tax rolls through the termination of the theretofore continuing right of redemption. Whether a change from a conditional right of redemption which might continue indefinitely and, in any event, may not be terminated until after 21 days’ notice is less desirable than an unconditional right to redeem within one year from the date the 1941 legislation became effective, is a question upon which reasonable minds may differ. I therefore place my concurrence in the judgment upon the sole ground that the new procedure is a reasonable regulation of the method for collection of taxes by the state.