stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force is measured “from the perspective of the officer on the scene, with the understanding that officers must often make split-second decisions in difficult situations”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force is measured “from the perspective of the officer on the scene, with the understanding that officers must often make split-second decisions in difficult situations”
- providing that when analyzing whether an officer’s 17 actions create liability for tort claims on the basis that the officer violated the 18 plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 19 Amendment, the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force is measured “from the 5 1 perspective of the officer on the scene, with the understanding that officers must often 2 make split-second decisions in difficult situations”
- remanding for reconsideration of summary judgment where the district court had not given “full consideration” to potential independent ground presented by the parties
- “[i]f [the suspect] did not make any threatening motion toward [the][o]fficer ... or if [the][o]f- ficer ... was twelve yards away from [the suspect], a jury could reasonably conclude that [the][o]fficer ... did not have probable cause to believe [he] was in immediate danger and that no reasonable officer could have believed that shooting [the suspect] under this factual scenario was lawful”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARTZ, Judge (concurring).
{20} I join fully Judge Wechsler’s opinion for the Court. I write separately only to emphasize that the defendant officers attempted to justify the shooting of Mr. Archuleta solely on the ground of the threat he posed to the officers’ safety. In particular, they did not argue that deadly force may have been permissible because of the threat he posed to his wife or other members of the public. The United States Supreme Court stated in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), that if “there is probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.” In a footnote the Court also indicated that an officer may use deadly force “to apprehend ‘perpetrators who, in the course of their crime threatened the use of deadly force, or if the officer believes there is a substantial risk that the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed,’ ” when the officer “ ‘know[s], as a virtual certainty, that the suspect committed an offense for which the use of deadly force is permissible.’ ” Id. at 9 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (quoting President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 189 (1967)).