“It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnapping in the state.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnapping in the state.”
- rape victim dragged 22 feet from her car
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119 (1969)
See State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (1963) (en banc) (moving victim at knife point from bathroom to screened porch sufficient movement); People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (1951) (en banc) (“It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnapping in the state.”), overruled by People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 238 (196…
The opinion
CARTER, J.
I dissent.
Because, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Edmonds and myself in People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 468, 469 [ 218 P.2d 769 , 19 A.L.R.2d 1084 ], there is no adequate record upon which this court may review the judgments of conviction against the defendant, I would reverse said judgments and order denying defendant a new trial on that ground alone. A reading of the majority opinion, however, convinces me that many flagrant errors were committed during the trial which would ordinarily be held to be prejudicial and require the reversal of a judgment of conviction. In fact, the only way I can rationalize the majority opinion is that those concurring therein feel that a person charged with 17 felonies of the character of those charged *194 against the defendant, and who represents himself, is not entitled to a trial in accordance with the rules applicable to. the ordinary criminal case. I cannot subscribe to this doctrine.
EDMONDS, J.
The judgments of conviction, including two which carry a sentence of death, are affirmed upon a record which, admittedly, is not a complete transcript of the proceedings before the trial court. As I pointed out in People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 470 [ 218 P.2d 769 , 19 A.L.R.2d 1084 ], the transcript omits certain pertinent testimony and was made up in a manner which does not comply with the Rules on Appeal. It was certified by the trial judge as a substitute for a correct record and was considered by him “. . . as the basis of establishing a transcript on appeal. ’ ’
Manifestly, this court could not make “an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence” as required by the Constitution (Const., art. VI, § 4½) without “the entire record of the action” to which the appellant is entitled. (Rules on Appeal, rule 33, subd. c.) Notwithstanding these provisions, in the absence of a showing by the appellant that he has been prejudiced by omissions and inaccuracies in the record, the approximate and inexact transcript is held to be a sufficient basis for reviewing the judgments of conviction. Such procedure, in my opinion, has taken from Chessman a substantial right.
For these reasons, and without considering other points presented by the appellant, I would reverse the judgments of conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.
A petition for a stay of remittitur and appellant’s petition for a rehearing were denied January 15, 1952. Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the petition for a rehearing should be granted.