The opinion
SCHAUER, J.
I concur in the judgment of reversal as to both Joseph Gigli and Arthur Gigli. In my opinion the evidence fails to support the finding that John Corti, in the operation of the automobile, was not the agent of Arthur Gigli. If John Corti was operating the car as the agent of Arthur Gigli, then the use of the car was that of Arthur Gigli. Regardless of the asserted admonition by Joseph Gigli (the father) to Arthur (his son) not to permit anyone else to drive it, he did consent to its use by Arthur. The situation is substantially the same as though the father had admonished the son not to operate the vehicle negligently. As Arthur was “using” the car at the time of the accident, its use was within the consent given by the father, even though Arthur had disobeyed his father’s instruction not to permit another to operate it.
If Arthur had assumed to loan the vehicle to John for John’s personal usage, as distinguished from that of Arthur, *462 we should have a different question, for which I suggest no answer here.
When a person to whom an automobile has been entrusted embezzles it, and converts it to his own use in derogation of the title of the owner, I think the owner should not be held fictionally to have consented to usage which he did not in fact consent to, either expressly or impliedly. But when the usage which the bailee makes of a borrowed vehicle does not amount to a conversion of it, his mere disobedience of admonitions as to his personal conduct in the operation of the automobile within the scope of the authorized use should not exculpate the owner from the liability otherwise imposed by the statute.
In this case, Joseph Gigli consented to the use of the ear by his son, and such consent covered the time and place in question. The father, therefore, is liable for negligence in its operation while it was being so used even though he had forbidden his son to allow another to operate it and his son had disobeyed such instruction. In the eyes of the law, by reason of the agency relationship, John Corti’s operation of the automobile was Arthur Gigli’s use of it. The consent of Joseph Gigli to such use (that is, use by Arthur) is all that is necessary to fasten liability upon him for negligence in its operation. As long as the vehicle was being used by Arthur, whether personally or through his agent, Joseph cannot avoid responsibility for negligence in its operation.