The opinion
TRAYNOR, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the first six paragraphs of the majority opinion and in the conclusion that a taxpayer has no right to a trial de novo in the superior court to resolve the conflicting issues of fact as to the taxable value of his property. In my opinion, however, the record of the board of equalization proceedings discloses nothing to indicate that plaintiffs were denied due process of law.
In their complaint to the county board of equalization plaintiffs contended that the assessments of their properties were excessive because the assessor had used a discriminatory method of determining value. On July 18, 1940, they had a hearing before three members of the board of equalization. Their expert testified that the assessed value should have been arrived at by a volumetric method applied on an acreage basis. The assessor’s method was based on production value of existing wells, which was explained by his oil valuation engineer. The board of equalization accepted the latter’s testimony and denied relief to plaintiffs. Constructive fraud cannot be predicated on that acceptance. (Los Angeles etc. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164, 169-170 [ 121 P. 384 , 9 A.L.R. 1277 ]; Birch v. County of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 741 [ 200 P. 647 ].)
The majority opinion is based, not on what occurred at the hearing on July 18th, but on what occurred when the matters came up for decision at the formal meeting of the board of August 1, 1940. Equalization matters in Los Angeles County are customarily heard by three board members, different groups of three sitting on different days. Many cases are taken under submission and called up for decision when all five members of the board are present so that all submitted matters ready for decision can be passed upon at one time. If a fourth or fifth member should vote upon an application *365 that he did not hear, his vote must be disregarded, but that would not invalidate the proceeding. The transcript of the board proceedings shows that when the two applications in these cases were called up for decision, there were two other applications involving other oil properties heard by different board members, one of whom was Supervisor Smith. The record discloses that he made no remarks designed to influence the three board members who heard the evidence in the present cases and voted to deny the applications.
There was nothing improper in the attendance at the board meeting of the deputy county counsel who represented the assessor. The record discloses that he did nothing to influence the vote of any member of the board.
There is no merit in the contention that the board intentionally withheld any judgment for the purpose of submitting the matter later in court. According to the record Supervisor McDonough was simply not convinced that plaintiff’s property had been improperly assessed and was of the opinion that whatever remedy the taxpayer might have must be through the courts. Even if his reasoning was erroneous, and the decision in which he joined was based on it, the decision would not violate due process any more than would an erroneous judgment of any court. (Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 317 [ 265 P. 246 ] ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461 [ 27 S.Ct. 556 , 51 L.Ed. 879 ]; Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409, 414 [ 20 S.Ct. 153 , 44 L.Ed. 217 ] ; Jones v. Buffalo Creek etc. Co., 245 U.S. 328, 329 [ 38 S.Ct. 121 , 62 L.Ed. 325 ]; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 110, 112 [ 16 S.Ct. 80 , 40 L.Ed. 91 ] ; Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 [ 58 S.Ct. 185 , 82 L.Ed. 268 ].)
The majority opinion declares that “while three of the board members, as above noted, had heard extensive testimony as to the valuation bases with respect to plaintiffs' leases, they did not correlate this prior hearing of factual evidence with plaintiffs’ applications.” There is nothing in the record to indicate that the three members who heard the evidence did not correlate it with the plaintiffs’ applications. Having no special insight into the mental processes of the board members this court cannot determine that they failed to correlate plaintiffs ’ applications and the evidence heard in the previous hearing. Indeed, the presumption is that they did. (Utah Construction Co. v. Richardson, 187 Cal. 649, 654 [ 203 P. 401 ]; *366 Savings & Loan Soc. v. San Francisco, 146 Cal. 673, 678 [ 80 P. 1086 ]; Hannon v. Madden, 214 Cal. 251, 267 [ 5 P.2d 4 ]; Wild Goose Country Club v. County of Butte, 60 Cal.App. 339, 342 [ 212 P. 711 ]; Merchants Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 103 Cal.App. 473, 478 [ 284 P. 1072 ]; Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 [ 56 S.Ct. 426 , 80 L.Ed. 532, 536 ].) It must therefore be concluded that the evidence failed to convince them that the assessments were improper. There is no requirement that the board members give written opinions in the cases before them or set forth orally the mental processes that prompted their conclusions. Indeed, there can be no inquiry into those processes to impeach their decision. (Chicago B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 [ 27 S.Ct. 326 , 51 L.Ed. 636 ].) Nor can their written or oral expression of opinion be used for that purpose. "To hold that oral or written opinions or expressions of judges of trial courts may be resorted to to overturn judgments would be to open the door to mischievous and vexatious practices.” (De Cou v. Howell, 190 Cal. 741, 751 [ 214 P. 444 ].)
Moreover, the decision of the board was made by three members. Only one member’s expression of opinion is attacked. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the majority shared his view. The prevailing opinion states that “Supervisors Jessup and Hauge, in failing to deny any of the incorrect statements made incident to the adverse ruling upon the plaintiffs’ applications, manifestly acquiesced therein upon the same erroneous premise.” Supervisor McDonough was speaking for himself, and his statement was no more binding on the other members of the board than statements from the bench by one member of this court would be on the other members, in ruling on motions or during oral arguments. Each member may have his own reasons for his vote and may not only disagree with the statements of the others but interpret them differently. Otherwise members of any judicial body would be constrained to deny all statements of their colleagues with which they disagreed, and the consequence would be interminable hearings.
There is no question in this ease that plaintiffs had a fair hearing before an appropriate tribunal, as required by the due process clause. None of the charges is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment of a superior court or any other court. There is no reason why they should suffice to set aside the *367 decision of a quasi judicial body like the local board in this case. (See Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831 [ 123 P.2d 457 ].)