legislative history suggests that predecessor to Or.Rev.Stat. § 659A.142(3) was intended to prohibit discrimination by business or commercial enterprises which offer goods or services to the public
How later courts described this case
- legislative history suggests that predecessor to Or.Rev.Stat. § 659A.142(3) was intended to prohibit discrimination by business or commercial enterprises which offer goods or services to the public
- "[I]t is commonly known that membership in the Boy Scouts of America is open to any boy within the specified age group without any other limitation whatsoever."
- discussing the purpose of HB 2116
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DENECKE, C. J.,
specially concurring.
I specially concur to state a rule of statutory construction which I believe is preferable to that stated in the majority opinion.
The majority states:
«* * * rp^g reas0I1) in our view, is that the term 'place or service’ is 'ambiguous,’ at least in a legal sense, because the words 'place’ and 'service’ are general terms and the intended meaning of such words in any given *337 context may depend upon the intent with which such words were used. For that reason, this court may properly consider the legislative history of ORS 30.675 for the purpose of determining, if possible, the intent of the legislature in the use of that term.” (Footnotes deleted.)
I prefer the rule as stated in United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 US 534, 543-544 , 60 S Ct 1059 , 84 L Ed 1345 , rehr den 311 US 724 , 61 S Ct 53 , 85 L Ed 472 (1940):
"* * * When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.’ * * * »
See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The ’’Plain-meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the ”Modern” Federal Courts, 75 Colum L Rev 1299 (1975).