explaining that, “[w]hen an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense,” but that such fees do not include “those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself’
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, “[w]hen an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that expense,” but that such fees do not include “those attributable to the bringing of the bad faith action itself’
- holding that attorney’s fees can satisfy the element of damages in a first-party bad faith insurance claim because hiring a lawyer to deal with an insurance company’s bad faith is akin to hiring a doctor to resolve injuries from a car accident
- holding that when an insurer withholds benefits under an insurance policy, attorney's fees reasonably incurred to compel the payment of such benefits are recoverable
- recognizing that in the absence of bad faith, an insured cannot recover “attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining benefits that the insurer erroneously, but in good faith, withheld from the insured”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems, 179 Cal. App. 3d 408 (1986)
Brandt is distinguishable from the present case in that in Brandt there was an underlying contractual relationship.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur.
It is time, however, that we forthrightly overruled the decision, rendered by a divided court, in Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 1 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 582 P.2d 1010 ], (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 818, fn. 4.) In our unanimous opinion in Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 508 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 551 , 674 P.2d 253 ], we restricted the Davis rule so severely that it is now limited in effect to one narrow category: products liability cases. Why there should be a different rule on attorney fees in products liability cases as distinguished from all other causes has never been adequately explained.
To avoid further confounding the bench and bar, we should make it clear that Davis is no longer viable and that the rule of the present case and of Prentice v. North Amer. Title Guar. Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 381 P.2d 645 ], prevails in California.